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The following abbreviations are used throughout this thesis when referring to Charles 
Williams’s prose works.  
 
SE  Shadows of Ecstasy. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans,1949 
MD  Many Dimensions. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans,1949 
WH  War in Heaven. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans,1949 
POL  The Place of the Lion. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans,1949 
GT  The Greater Trumps. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans,1949 
DH  Descent into Hell. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans,1949 
AHE  All Hallow’s Eve. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans,1949 
DOD  The Descent of the Dove: A Short History of the Holy Spirit in the Church. 
  London: Longmans, 1939 
Heaven He Came Down From Heaven and The Forgiveness of Sins. London: Faber & 





 The modernist project was a search for a totalizing narrative. Charles Williams’s ethos was 
marked by his concern for the integrity of the Other, characterized particularly in his refusal, 
in his novels, to name the presence of God, and in his articulation of his Doctrine of 
Substituted Love. Thus he inscribed a potent resistance to the totalitarian drive in modernist 
thought and society, a resistance that shares fascinating resonances with the writings of 
Derrida, Levinas and MacIntyre in their quest for a post-modern sensibility able to cope with 




On first reading, Charles Williams’s work seems somewhat quaint, even archaic. His 
rhetorical style is decidedly dated; his themes appear to belong to a pre-modernist era, before 
the psychic dislocations of modernity and the Great War. Yet far from being an anachronism, 
Williams was passionately engaged with the social, political, intellectual and moral issues of 
his day. These issues have not left us. Perhaps they impinge upon us more now than ever. If 
that is the case, then Williams is more relevant today than he has ever been. 
 
 It is the argument of this thesis that Williams offers in his work a determined 
resistance to totalitarianism. I use the term in its broadest sense, to include political, ethical 
and even ontological aspects. Further on I shall offer a more detailed analysis of the various 
fields and operations of totalitarianism, but for the purposes of this introduction let it be 
understood as an attempt to inscribe upon some aspect of human life a single all-
encompassing, or totalizing, narrative that reifies the human into a single component within a 
larger mechanism that has a fixed purpose (or eschatology) which excludes all other 
possibilities of existence. In doing so it reduces the Other to an aspect of the self, denying 
everything outside the being of the self any prospect of independent existence. Clearly, this 
process operates on multiple levels – within society, as political discourse; between persons, 
as ethical behaviour; and most fundamentally, at the level of ontology, totalitarianism denies 
the being of anything apart from the self. It is nihilistic solipsism.  
 
 Totalitarianism, therefore, is the fundamental form of injustice, that is, unethical 
behaviour. Indeed, for Williams, it is the root of sin. My reading of his novels will seek to 
demonstrate that the basis of human wickedness is the desire to reify the Other into a 
narrative which serves the needs of the self, thereby denying it independent existence. The 
theoretical background for such a reading is provided by what Behler refers to as the 
“Confrontations” between Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida [Behler,viii].  
 
 Nietzsche is well known as the philosopher of “the end of metaphysics”, and it is in 
this context that I wish to examine him in relation to Williams. It has been well-established 
that Nietzsche’s work was heavily distorted after his death by those seeking theoretical 
backing for quite vicious social-political practice, but what has perhaps been missed by his 
apologists is the fact that he really did believe in the superiority of the Übermensch over the 
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sheep-like masses. This supposed superiority is, moreover, not based on moral considerations 
but force of will – specifically, the will to power. The superior man, therefore, is the one who 
believes himself superior and then enforces that belief without being held back by notions of 
morality. He is beyond good and evil. Since the end of metaphysics results in the collapse of 
traditional meta-narratives of teleology, the only purpose of existence is what one makes of it 
– and of course, the Übermensch decides just what that will be. 
 
 It is thus no surprise that Nietzsche’s writings were adopted by Fascists all over the 
Western hemisphere. There can be little doubt that these ideas, circulating through England at 
a time when both Socialism (Fabian and otherwise) and Fascism were considered viable 
political leanings, reached Williams’s ears. His earlier novels reflect his concern with 
political totalitarianism whether emanating from the left or the right. Shadows of Ecstasy, 
War in Heaven and Many Dimensions are all concerned, in one way or another, with the 
moral problems that revolve around the concentration of power in the hands of the few – or 
the one. These problems become particularly acute when those in possession of power are 
simultaneously lacking in moral compass. The novels are in part meditations on just what 
happens when the reign of the Übermensch is inaugurated. 
 
 Heidegger occupies a similar position to Nietzsche, in being an intellectual giant 
whose reputation is somewhat tainted by association with National Socialism. It is in fact 
rather more difficult to defend him, since that association was not established after death as 
Nietzsche’s was1, but as early as 1933, when he served as rector of Freiburg University. It is 
doubtful, however, that his influence on contemporary discourse was as powerful as 
Nietzsche’s. Certainly the ramifications of his work have required many years to work out, 
and its subtlety does not lend well to the simple slogans of political language, unlike the 
dramatic, aphoristic prose of Nietzsche. 
 
 Heidegger’s greatest contribution to thought has been his phenomenology. His 
characterisation of Being – Dasein – ranks as one of the most significant and characteristic 
achievements of twentieth-century philosophy. It establishes ontology as the defining 
question of metaphysics, and then altogether explodes metaphysics by redefining what it 
means to be. Hatab argues that Heideggerian ontology provides critical insights into ethics. I 
                                                 
1 It being a fair bet that Nietzsche himself would have been disgusted by the Nazionalsocialiste Arbeiterpartei, 
though who knows what he would have made of Hitler. 
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wish to develop from his work a response to the moral emptiness of Nietzschean nihilism, 
and to articulate how the finitude of being opens us up, not to the free play of “the Gay 
Science” but to ethical responsibility. It is our very finitude that subjects us to the necessity of 
responding to the Other. The humility with which one accepts finitude and ethical 
responsibility, as opposed to the hubris of attempting to subject all existence to the will of the 
self, is an important theme in Williams’s writing. Time and again he emphasises the limits of 
the human, not in despair but in humble awe of all that lies outside the self. It is in the 
encounter with the limits of the self that his work encounters that of Derrida and Levinas. 
 
 Derrida may come across as an unusual name to find in a discussion of ethics or moral 
philosophy, but Critchley argues convincingly that Derrida, through and with Levinas, moves 
“towards a language that describes urgent ethical and political responsibilities” [Critchley, 
43]. It is by confronting the arguments of Nietzsche and Heidegger that Derrida makes this 
movement, while drawing upon the resources of Levinas’s ethics of the Face. I shall argue 
that, although these writers are not generally considered among the most significant of 
twentieth-century moral philosophers, they offer insights and arguments that contribute 
significantly to current discourses on ethics, particularly with regards to the issues with which 
Williams was engaged. 
 
 This critical engagement with ethics will be made clearer when placed within the 
larger context of developments in moral philosophy. Most importantly, Alasdair Macintyre 
has argued that our view of ethics must fall to a choice between Aristotelian deontology (that 
is, ethics as essential and hence absolute) or Nietzschean amorality (in which ethics is 
ultimately a smokescreen for the operation of the will to power). It is my contention that 
Levinas and Derrida articulate a third way that reveals both options as being trapped in a 
discourse that privileges ontology; furthermore, that this emphasis on being, rather than the 
Other (or alterity) is the source of injustice. This is an extension, and a refinement, of 
Heidegger’s work, as applied to ethics. It is also Williams’s position: his conception of 
morality emphasises the primacy of the encounter with the Other. 
 
 What sets Williams apart from the philosophers, however, is that his moral universe 
includes the Christian God. More specifically, it includes the God who sent Messias 
(Williams’s preferred spelling) to die for the sins of man. Thus, for Williams, the Other is not 
merely a concept, but the trace of the operation of God’s grace. Thus, alterity is the condition 
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of God’s encounter with man – and hence, the condition of all ethical encounters. Williams 
grounds man’s existence upon a web of relations that ultimately mediates his personal 
relationship with God. It is the restoration of this relationship that is Messias’s mission. 
Although he quite intentionally refuses to name God (qua the Christian God) in his novels, 
his theology underlies each of his narratives. 
 
 Williams has been recognised as being an unconventional theologian, very much 
more mystic than scholastic. It is my intention to argue two points regarding this matter: 
firstly, that the mystical strand of theology, to which Williams belongs, is part of a 
longstanding Christian tradition of negative theology that acts as a corrective and supplement 
to more conventional, positivistic theology; and secondly, that this tradition has unique 
insights and resources to offer contemporary philosophical debate. Indeed, my contention is 
that Williams, in recognising this possibility, anticipated many of the themes that arise 
through deconstructive reading practice. This is not to say that he is in complete agreement 
with Derrida and his interlocutors; it does, however, imply a certain commonality of 
approach and sympathy of aim.  
 
 The sympathy is crucial: both in the ordinary sense of being important, and in the 
sense in which Derrida speaks of clôtural reading. A more detailed exposition of its processes 
will come in the relevant chapter; let it suffice for now to point out that it is a way of reading 
that involves maintaining two (or more) strands of interpretation, and examining with the 
utmost care the crossing between those strands, hence the symbol of the χ as emblematic of 
this procedure. What is of first significance is that Williams’s texts invite, indeed perhaps 
they demand, such a type of reading – which may be the only ethical response to these texts. 
Clôtural reading is not passive: it performs an act of resistance against interpretations that 
attempt to totalize the text, to make it conform to a single “meaning”. It is ethical language, 
as Wittgenstein defines it – the “endless attempt to run up against the limits of language, a 
form of astonishment that cannot be expressed in a question and for which there is no 
answer.” [Critchley, 43] 
 
 Williams’s work requires so demanding an ethical engagement because it inscribes an 
engagement as strong and as complex. For Williams, morality works with absolute precision 
– he speaks of “the moral mathematics of the glory” [Heaven, 30] – but also with ineffable 
complexity. Precision and complexity are not exclusive; indeed Hofstadter argues, following 
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Gödel, that complexity arises from precision, and furthermore that formal systems, in 
attempting to fully define their field, inevitably and necessarily assume truths that cannot be 
proven within the said systems. This fundamental rupture does not invalidate system, or 
tradition, but it does speak of the need always for something more, a supplement or parergon, 
to close the picture. This is where clôtural reading comes in, with its emphasis on closure 
instead of completion. A line may indeed be drawn around the text, but there is always room 
for the play of discussion within, and that play will always have the potential to disrupt any 
attempt to totalize the meaning of the text. The precision with which “the glory” operates also 
precludes any attempt to fix its nature. All this comes most sharply into focus in my reading 
of Williams’s The Greater Trumps. 
 
 Thus, for Williams, there is not so much a single “third way” but a third way which is 
an ethically engaged and responsible choice out of the entire range of possible behaviours. It 
is for this reason that he speaks of the dual traditions of the Way of Affirmation of Images 
and the Way of Rejection of Images. In his theology, the two Ways are not exclusive – 
indeed they are complementary: necessary to sanctity and sanity both [DOD, 31]. They 
should not be mistaken as corresponding to positive and negative theology; they are more 
primal than that. It is my intention to argue that “Images” in this context refers to ontology, 
and that Williams suggests a finely poised response to the difficulties both of privileging 
ontology and of denigrating it. This would take him even beyond the scope of Derrida and 
Levinas, into a realm of ethical praxis that is, fittingly enough, inspired by Aristotle. 
 
 The name Alasdair Macintyre has already been mentioned earlier in this introduction. 
Macintyre is perhaps the most important recent Anglo-American moral philosopher, for in 
After Virtue he inaugurated a fresh movement in the discourse of ethics – virtue ethics. Of 
course, the field of virtue ethics is hardly a new one: Macintyre himself traces its roots in 
Western philosophy back to Aristotle2. It is important, however, to note that it is an area of 
study much neglected in the modern era. The modern emphasis on the detached, objective 
viewpoint, coupled with ‘democratic’ notions of the equality of men, had abstracted from 
ethical discourse any discussion of the person performing the ethical act.  
 
                                                 
2 In Eastern philosophy, one might point to the Rig Vedas, the Mahabharata and the Chinese sages, from 
Kongzi (Confucius) onwards. 
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 This reduction of the unique quality of the individual in his or her ethical milieu to a 
cipher or placeholder for absolute abstractions such as Being, will-to-power or the categorical 
imperative is an act of ontological violence ultimately responsible for the failings of modern-
day ethics. Utilitarianism, in the Anglo-American tradition, is not exempt. That tradition is 
castigated by Williams in Shadows of Ecstasy and Descent into Hell. Williams does not take 
on Marxism directly in his work, but it does not escape implicit criticism. The sweeping 
indictment is of all political and social ideologies that seek to assume total control of the 
human narrative by reducing the individual to an example of a class. This is the fundamental 
movement of totalitarianism, and it is a movement that Williams is committed to resisting.  
 
 Macintyre seeks in his study of virtue to re-locate the individual in his or her 
historical context. For him, ethical behaviour is dependent on the social environment in 
which it takes place, and is a necessary feature of society that enables it to keep functioning. 
Hence, ethical virtue is a conservative force dependent on the prevailing social structure. For 
Macintyre, the choice is between expressing the current set of virtues and refusing to do so. 
The latter is, in his view, nihilistic. What is interesting about Macintyre’s conception of virtue 
is that it transforms deontological virtue into culture-relative values. The danger of such a 
position has been aptly diagnosed by Foucault and the generation of cultural critics that has 
followed him: if virtue is what enables society to function, then how does one judge the 
society? Is it then possible to speak of a virtuous society at all? And if injustice exists within 
a society, how does one reconcile virtue with the need to regenerate society? 
 
 These concerns exercise Williams’s mind as well. Yet even if Macintyre’s virtue 
ethics fall short, it is important to retain their emphasis on the individual. One therefore must 
critique both individual and society simultaneously. Moral failure lies not with either 
exclusively but is a product of the interaction of the two. To privilege one or the other is to 
reduce the ethical to a function either of metaphysics or of sociology. The error of all ethical 
systems has been on either side – small wonder, for the nature of systems is to simplify and to 
judge based on abstractions and reductions. 
 
 Williams, however, is ultimately able to give voice to his critique precisely because 
he does not judge. In the moral universe he inhabits, judgment is reserved for God; it is for 
humans but to receive grace, to forgive and be forgiven. Indeed, his point is that the root of 
sin – totalitarianism in its various forms and flavours – appears when man takes upon himself 
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the grave and awesome duty of passing judgment on good and evil; that is, wishing to “be as 
God, knowing good and evil” [Gen 3:5]. He resists the systematisation of ethics, because any 
reduction at all of the totality of context and performer is an injustice and an act of violence. 
Finite being requires infinite wisdom to judge truly; and therefore, like Aquinas, regarding 
that of which we cannot speak we must perforce be silent. 
 
 Williams takes a very traditional Christian stance, upholding the sovereignty of God. 
In his interpretation, the true Christian narrative is anti-totalitarian, disruptive and eruptive; it 
questions, disquiets and destabilises all other narratives. It resists all forms of totalisation, 
because God cannot be totalized; there is always something more, and the telos of man is to 
praise and enjoy the excess of that glory. To do less is ingratitude; to do more is hubris. 
Williams would have us do all we can and must, and rest content. 
 
 Under this analysis, totalitarianism becomes a broader concept than it is usually seen 
to be in political discourse. It runs through and informs all levels of human existence. It rears 
its head whenever any finite intelligence presumes to reduce what is outside its own existence 
into a function of its own narrative. It is literally selfish, at the most profound level, for it 
seeks to place all other existence at the service of its own. This is the most basic, and most 
egregious, form of pride: believing that one’s finite being can encompass the infinitude of 
Creation, and of God. Ontological totalitarianism is the root of sin, the “love of money” of 
Scripture, for it seeks to reify all value into a medium of exchange, of which the self can take 
possession. 
 
 What follows from the attempt by the self to reduce the Other to a function of its own 
being is social-ethical totalitarianism, in which one tries to force another to conform to one’s 
own notion of good. That good, being unique to the self, is not necessarily the good of 
another; hence there is resistance. Resistance breeds the drive to dominate, to control; the 
failure of that drive to accomplish its goal results in anger, hatred, and all the other 
deformations of the soul. This all stems from the refusal to admit that the good of others may 
entail the suffering of the self; but this insight is the bedrock of Christianity, and the 
foundation of Williams’s doctrine of Substituted Love. Williams insists on the duty to bear 
the burden of others, sacrificially and even (especially) when met with ingratitude – it is the 
affirmation of the reality and the value of the Other. 
 
 13
 The most common notion of totalitarianism is, of course, political. Williams lived in 
an era of political turmoil. In his lifetime, the political structure and balance of Europe 
changed dramatically; even in England, for a time, there was real concern over the influence 
of Fascism and Communism, which were even debated as viable political choices. Looming 
over all this, as well as the final years of Williams’s life, was Hitler and National Socialism. 
The great evil of the day was the menace of a totalitarian state dedicated to the reduction of 
all peoples to subjects beneath its banner – a banner that flew over most of Europe, and 
whose final defeat Williams did not live to witness. Small wonder, then, that his works are 
often directly engaged in arguing against all the forms of that menace.  
 
 Williams’s intelligence, compassion and humility are obvious in his resistance to 
totalitarianism. Beginning with the trenchant political analysis of Shadows of Ecstasy 
(written, it must be noted, around the period of the rise of Fascism, before its evils were 
obvious to most), continuing through the social debate of War in Heaven and Many 
Dimensions, to the personal dramas of damnation, redemption and salvation of his later 
novels, he explores the roots of totalitarianism in the nature of fallen humanity. It is the task 
of this paper to undertake that quest alongside him, and perhaps to elucidate the subtler points 




Domination and Resistance: Nietzsche and Williams  
 
Williams’s first novel was published in 1933; his last in 1945. This 12-year period coincided 
almost perfectly with the general rise and fall of Fascism all around the world, and National 
Socialism in Germany particularly, with all the struggles and evils that arc entailed. It is 
therefore fitting to take into consideration the world in which Williams lived, and the 
philosophical underpinnings of that world. More specifically, it is necessary to examine how 
Williams engages with Nietzsche: both the distorted version bandied about by the Nazis, and 
the authentic philosopher of the will to power and the death of metaphysics. Nietzsche’s work 
represents the Zeitgeist of the era, and the ends to which his writing was eventually put reflect 
well the dangers of philosophical texts in the hands of ideologues. Williams saw this danger 
and confronted it through the medium of the novel. 
 
 Nietzsche’s greatest preoccupation is with language – the language of metaphysics. 
He does not subscribe to the traditional idea of a search for truth. Thus he begins with 
semiology, positing a state of affairs with which we are well familiar through poststructuralist 
theory: that signification is based not on presence, but on difference. He rejects the notion of 
a truth with a fixed meaning, opening up the practice of interpretation to an infinite play – the 
“Gay Science” of the post-Enlightenment world. The world is fundamentally chaotic “in the 
sense not of a lack of necessity but of a lack of order, arrangement, form, beauty, wisdom, 
and whatever other names there are for our aesthetic anthropomorphisms” [Nietzsche: 1974, 
168]. It is a world in which belief in truth is “an idiocy” [ibid., 335]. ‘Truth’ is whatever form 
can be imposed on formless existence by a will to power. Hence in Nietzsche’s worldview 
metaphysics evaporates as a ground for being, for there is nothing beyond the play of 
discourse.  
 
 All phenomena, all beings, are subject to this: “whatever exists, having somehow 
come into being, is again and again re-interpreted to new ends, taken over, transformed, and 
redirected by some power superior to it” [Nietzsche: 1969a, 77] Thus all discourse is a 
competitive configuration of forces, forming “a topology of forces with changing, sliding 
forms of domination” [Behler, 79].  
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 Domination is a major theme in his writing, hence his diagnosis of Christianity as the 
fatal sickness of Western civilisation. He argues that the priest exists in order to justify the 
domination of slave by master, and that the slave mentality represents an affront to 
authenticity. Humility is perhaps the only sin in Nietzsche’s worldview, for it is an abrogation 
of the authentic desire of the self for dominion over others. To be dominated, indeed, is death, 
for then “a will to power has become master of something less powerful and imposed upon it 
the character of a function” [Nietzsche: 1969a, 77]. The self, reduced to a function of an alien 
will to power, no longer exists as an independent entity. Therefore, for a will to power to 
exist in its full selfhood, it must dominate others. There is no choice in the matter, because 
any failure to dominate means one becomes a slave and thence is lost to the master-slave 
relation. “God” is the name invoked to justify the relation; the metaphysics of presence, or 
onto-theology, serves as a lever of control. As Barth has convincingly argued [Barth 8], 
however, this conception of God is an extremely limited one that fails to take into account the 
theology of the Cross, that is, of Christ’s sacrifice for man. Yet that very concept – which 
Williams calls the Doctrine of Substituted Grace – is central both to conventional theology 
and to Williams’s mystic conception of presence.  
 
 The proponents of National Socialism appropriated Nietzsche’s emphasis on 
domination and transmogrified it from a meditation on morals and a critique of onto-theology 
into the ideology of lebensraum. The death of the God of metaphysics inaugurated the death 
of ethical relation, and thence the physical death of millions. Williams lived through this era, 
and personally witnessed some of the devastation it wrought. His resistance is natural, and 
obvious; what is perhaps less natural, more wonderful, is the nature of that resistance, for he 
does not allow his faith to be shaken, even when God is declared dead. His God is not the 
God of metaphysics, but the Omnipotence, which is absolutely transcendent and absolutely 
other. Nietzsche’s metaphysical critique is directed at the straw man of a god grounded in 
presence, that is, an idol; Williams believes in a God characterized by absence.  
 
 Ingraffia’s analysis of Nietzsche is most cogent here: 
 
[Nietzsche’s rejection] of any belief in “the way”… leads to the imposition of the will 
of the strong over the weak [and] mandates the radical freedom of humanity, but only 
for the noble overmen like himself…. Nietzsche claims to redeem mankind from 
guilt, not as Christianity does by showing a way to be freed from the real guilt of sin 
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through forgiveness, but rather by asserting that guilt and sin are illusions invented by 
priests out of ressentiment against the noble, the strong and the free…. Nietzsche’s 
real objection to God and a divinely ordered world [is that if] God existed, the 
overman would not be his own master and would not be free to follow his own will to 
power…. Nietzsche argues that the problem with Christianity is that it devalues the 
natural world of time and becoming, that it labels this life as a punishment, the body 
as sinful, and this world as evil…. Nietzsche believed that once the overman “killed 
the author of life” (Acts 3:15), that he would then become lord of his own life; after 
he murdered the creator of the earth, he could create his own world. The beginning 
and end of Nietzsche’s philosophy is the death of God, and this desire for the death of 
God originates out of the desire for freedom and autonomy. [Ingraffia, 96f.] 
 
Nietzsche’s freedom is achieved through the death of the god of onto-theology. What 
he misses is that this god was never very much alive in the first place. The living God 
honoured by Williams and Ingraffia, on the other hand, granted freedom to man through the 
enactment of His own death, by emptying (kenosis) the world of divine presence so that the 
human could, in the words of the Athanasian Creed, be taken into the divine. For freedom to 
be meaningful requires that it has reference to a reality outside  its own determination (will to 
power), and in a world in which there is no autonomous meaning, in which, that is, all 
meaning is determined by the self without reference to the other, freedom is merely a 
rhetorical term for the enslavement of the self to its desire. The very existence of objective 
justice, called for by an ethical demand beyond the confines of the self, is the condition of the 
possibility of human freedom. 
 
Nietzsche is very much Williams’s antithesis, and it is illustrative to examine this 
analysis point by point to see how they are opposed. Williams does far more than merely 
oppose Nietzsche. True to his highly synthetic mode of argumentation, he actually co-opts 
the arguments and acts as a parergon, a corrective frame that ultimately surpasses and 
supplants what is in that frame.  
 
Firstly, then, Williams does not accept Nietzsche’s rejection of “the way”. Neither 
does he follow slavishly the concept of there being a single correct mode of existence. It is 
his thesis in The Figure of Beatrice that there are two basic modes of existence, both of which 
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are perfectly acceptable in Christian life but each needing the other to temper its potential 
excesses. These are the Way of Affirmation of Images and the Way of Rejection of Images.  
 
Williams identifies the Way of Rejection of Images with the mainstream of religious 
practice in the Church, epitomizing it in “the great intellectual teacher” Dionysius the 
Areopagite3. This is an interesting identification, because the Pseudo-Dionysius (as the 
Areopagite is also known) is a fairly marginal figure in theology, despite being the progenitor 
of the tradition of negative theology. He is, for example, entirely ignored in Alister 
McGrath’s popular and widely-used textbook Christian Theology: An Introduction [1997]; 
yet he is central to Williams’s understanding of the Way of Rejection. Perhaps the best 
method to sum up that Way is, then, as Williams did, to quote Dionysius himself: 
 
Once more, ascending yet higher, we maintain that It is not soul, or mind, or endowed 
with the faculty of imagination, conjecture, reason, or understanding; nor is It any act 
of reason or understanding; nor can It be described by the reason or perceived by the 
understanding, since It is not number, or order, or greatness, or littleness, or equality, 
or inequality, and since it is not immovable nor in motion, or at rest, and has no 
power, and is not power or light, and does not live, and is not life; nor is It personal 
essence, or eternity, or time; nor can It be grasped by the understanding, since It is not 
knowledge or truth; nor is It kingship or wisdom; nor is It one, nor is It unity, nor is It 
Godhead or Goodness; nor is It a spirit, as we understand the term, since It is not 
Sonship or Fatherhood; nor is it any other thing such as we or any other being can 
have knowledge of; nor does it belong to the category of non-existence or to that of 
existence; nor do existent beings know It as it actually is, nor does It know them as 
they actually are; nor can the reason attain to It to name It or to know It; nor is it 
darkness, nor is it light, or error, or truth; nor can any affirmation or negation apply to 
it; for while applying affirmations or negations to those orders of being that come next 
to It, we apply not unto It either affirmation or negation, inasmuch as it [sic] 
transcends all affirmation by being the perfect and unique Cause of all things, and 
transcends all negation by the pre-eminence of Its simple and absolute nature – free 
from every limitation and beyond them all. [Dionysius, quoted in FOB, 8f.] 
                                                 
3 There is a delicious irony here, for Nietzsche lauds the Dionysiac over the Apollonian in his analysis of 
tragedy. The Areopagite is indeed a disruptive force in theology, but his negative theology does not resist but 
rather supplements positive theology. 
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 We have here a series of negations, and negations of negations. The negativity that 
Dionysius writes of is not merely a refusal to limit God by naming His attributes. It is a 
radical negativity of an order that does not even admit to the intelligibility of attributes when 
applied to God. The Way of Rejection of Images entails the recognition of the limits of 
metaphysical language, the selfsame language that Nietzsche speaks of when he claims that 
“I fear we are not getting rid of God because we still believe in grammar.” [Nietzsche: 1968, 
38] Conceptual thought is simply incapable of apprehending God. Thus to approach God 
requires one not merely to renounce the things of the world, but actively to renounce the 
thinking of the world – indeed, to give up the intellect that is what separates man from beast. 
 
 However, “there is the book of Job to make it clear that our little minds were meant. 
A great curiosity ought to exist concerning divine things. Man was intended to argue with 
God.” [Heaven, 30] This is not a call to give up entirely the operation of the mind – but to 
realize that the human intellect and language are entirely inadequate. Still, it is necessary to 
make the attempt: 
 
The Lord demands that his people shall demand an explanation from him. Whether 
they understand it or like it when they get it is another matter, but demand it they must 
and shall. Humility has never consisted in not asking questions; it does not make men 
less themselves or less intelligent, but more intelligent and more themselves.  
[Heaven, 31] 
 
 How do we reconcile this? I believe that what Williams meant was that the Christian 
has to attain the moment of understanding of his own inadequacy, not have it taught to him; 
that each person must seek God to the point at which he or she realizes that God is not to be 
sought out, but is immanent at all times and places; and thence to understand that human 
endeavour is entirely inadequate to the divine purpose. Yet it is not unimportant – only 
through such a process can we understand truly the limits of the human, and thus learn true 
humility, the humility of intelligence and knowledge. This is not the craven humility that 
Nietzsche mocks, but a realistic appraisal of one’s personal limits.  
 
 The Way of Affirmation of Images, on the other hand, is a Romantic endeavour. 
Williams quotes St. Athanasius: ‘Not by the conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but by 
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taking of the Manhood into God.’ [quoted in FOB, 9] In other words, the Way of Affirmation 
was to perceive the divinity of Creation in every aspect of the created world, and thence to 
experience the divinity of God. Thus Williams speaks of “the inGodding of man” [ibid, 11] 
as the final result of this process, which he believes is a common human experience; “or 
rather it begins with one that is common and continues on a way which might be more 
common than it is.” [ibid, 11]  
 
 The expression par excellence of the Way of Affirmation of Images is the teleological 
argument for God. Whether God is seen as watchmaker or poet, the entirety of Creation is 
viewed as a work whose very perfection argues for the existence of a perfect Creator. 
Admittedly it is a fairly weak argument that has been dealt with emphatically in the modern 
era, particularly under the hammer of the various formulations of the Anthropic Principle.4 
Williams, however, applied the Way of Affirmation in a much more humanistic context, for it 
was his belief that authentic human relationships are a truer reflection of God’s glory. He 
refers to Dante’s love for Beatrice, which was love for a created being. That very love 
eventually brought Dante into encounter with God’s far greater love. The Figure of Beatrice 
argues that the entire Divine Comedy is a record of that journey from mortal to immortal 
love.  
 
 Crucially, though, Williams is at pains to indicate that the two Ways are not exclusive 
but belong to a dynamic that works itself out in every Christian soul: 
 
Neither of these two Ways indeed is, nor can be, exclusive. The most vigorous 
ascetic, being forbidden formally to hasten his death, is bound to attend to the 
actualities of food, drink and sleep which are also images, however brief his attention 
may be. The most indulgent of Christians is yet bound to hold his most cherished 
images – of food, drink, sleep, or anything else – negligible beside the final Image of 
God. And both are compelled to hold their particular Images of God negligible beside 
the universal Image of God which belongs to the Church, and even that less than the 
unimaged reality. [ibid, 10] 
 
                                                 
4 This states, to simplify greatly, that any intelligent being, having evolved in a specific environment, would 
upon looking at that environment find it ‘perfect’. The perfection would not be due to any supposed design in 
the environment, but rather the being’s own perfect adaptation to it. 
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 There is a tension between the two Ways, but the relationship is not one of 
domination. Rather, there is a sense of complementarity, and also of inadequacy. Each Way is 
insufficient in itself to capture the totality of man’s encounter with God, and even a synthesis 
of the two is ultimately insufficient. Always there is something else, something that escapes 
human discourse, and thus escapes metaphysics. It turns out that the God whose death 
Zarathustra announces is not at all the Christian God. It is what Barth refers to as “the god of 
this world” as opposed to “the living God” of Christianity [Barth, 13f.]. Williams’s position, 
then, is that Nietzsche’s criticisms fall short of the mark – or perhaps, are directed at a straw 
man. 
 
 Now, moving on to the second point in Ingraffia’s treatment of Nietzsche, or the 
question of sin – to recap, Nietzsche’s stand is that sin does not exist per se, but is an illusion 
generated by priests to control the will to power within potential overmen5. Williams agrees 
to the extent that for him sin is also, in a sense, illusion – but it is an illusion born not of the 
desire for control but for the desire for knowledge. For him, 
 
...evil can neither be defined nor known except by good…. It is therefore part of that 
knowledge that he should understand good in its deprivation, the identity of heaven in 
its opposite identity of hell, but without ‘approbation’, without calling it into being at 
all…. It was not so possible for man, and the myth [of the Fall] is the tale of the 
impossibility... Man desired to know schism in the universe... A serpentine subtlety 
overwhelmed the statement with a grander promise – ‘Ye shall be as gods, knowing 
good and evil.’ Unfortunately to be as gods meant, for the Adam, to die, for to know 
evil, for them, was to know it not by pure intelligence but by experience. It was, 
precisely, to experience the opposite of good, that is the deprivation of the good, and 
of themselves with the good. [Heaven, 20] 
 
 Furthermore, “They [the Adam] knew good; they wished to know good and evil. 
Since there was not – since there never has been and never will be – anything else than the 
good to know, they knew good as antagonism. All difference consists in the mode of 
knowledge.” [ibid, 21] Thus, for Williams, evil is nothing more than a misconception of the 
                                                 
5 It is realized that the usual translation for the Nietzschean term Übermensch is “Superman”. This is a 
misleading term in that it implies a person of greater virtue (in the Aristotelian sense). I prefer to translate it as 
“overman” to emphasize that the difference between one such and a normal person lies not in conventional 
standards of ability but rather in having a radically different and quite incommensurable moral sense. 
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good. There is no such thing as evil, a priori; hence, one can only know evil by an act of will. 
Man’s will to power seeks to know differently from God, and the only way to accomplish 
that is to separate that will from the ineffable and infinite goodness of God.  
 
 Strangely enough, then, the Nietzschean Übermensch would be similar to the 
prelapsarian Adam in Williams’s cosmology – a free agent, unencumbered by morals, 
because any and all action he might take would be good simply by virtue of being an action 
within Creation. The difference is that the Adam acts in innocence, but the Übermensch is 
fully cognizant of his will towards domination. He is fully located in temporality; the fall of 
the Adam is into time. The state of Paradise is timeless:  
 
This heaven which is beatitude is further defined by the second clause in which the 
word occurs in the Lord’s Prayer: ‘Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven.’ It is 
habitually assumed that the second part of the clause refers to the beings – angelic or 
other – who possess heaven as a place or are possessed by it as a state. The will that is 
to be fulfilled on earth is regarded as relating to other events and possibilities than 
those which are covered in heaven by the will already fulfilled…. The fulfillment of 
the will in heaven may grammatically relate to us as well as to angels. The events for 
which we sincerely implore that fulfillment upon earth are already perfectly 
concluded by it in heaven. Their conclusions have to be known by us on earth, but 
they already exist as events in heaven. Heaven, that is to say, possesses timelessness; 
it has the quality of eternity, of (in the definition which Boethius passed on to 
Aquinas) ‘the perfect and simultaneous possession of everlasting life’. In that 
simultaneity the passion of the prayer is already granted; all that is left for us to do is 
to discover in the process of time the conclusion that we have implored in time. [ibid, 
10-11]  
 
For Williams, then, the Fall is a matter of our gaining access to a mode of knowledge 
that necessitates the experience of evil, and the necessary corollary to that is an existence in 
time. Nietzsche’s doctrine of the Will to power is sufficient for temporal existence. If we 
existed only for the satisfaction of the self within its temporal boundaries of birth and death, 
we should indeed seek the domination of the self over the world, for morality would be 
meaningless. The self would be satisfied only with the absolute reduction of all lived reality 
to an extension of its will to power. But that does not mean that we are condemned: 
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It is obvious that, however we define heaven – spiritually or spatially – the word earth 
does in fact mean both. Earth is to us inevitably a place, but it is, also inevitably, the 
only state which we know, our spiritual state within that place. The identification of 
the two as earth has no doubt assisted us to see both spatial and spiritual meanings in 
the word heaven. But heaven is distinguished from earth, and earth at the moment 
may be taken to mean that place and state which have not the eternity of heaven. If it 
has a perfection, it is a temporal perfection, a perfection known in sequence. [ibid, 11-
12] 
 
This is echoed by Levinas: 
 
 Time is the most profound relationship that man can have with God, precisely 
as a going towards God. There is an excellence in time that would be lost in 
eternity… To accept time is to accept death as the impossibility of presence. To be in 
eternity is to be one, to be oneself, eternally. To be in time is to be for God (être à 
Dieu), a perpetual leave taking (adieu). [Cohen 1986: 23] 
 
 
In other words, heaven and earth are one and the same, except that earth is perceived 
temporally, while heaven exists outside time – or rather, is earth as it is seen by those who are 
not bound to temporal modes of perception. Thus any imprisonment of man in time is the 
result of his own limited ability to perceive: we create the trap of temporality by believing in 
its inescapability; when we are received into heaven, we see the perfection of Creation as 
those others of heaven do. This is entirely opposed to Nietzsche’s insistence on the dominion 
of the Übermensch in time, as a function of the eternal return. The concept of the eternal 
return is based on the notion of time as being endless; hence all possible configurations of 
matter recur endlessly. The moral force of such a concept lies in the desire to act in such a 
way that the recurrence not be a matter for regret. Essentially the eternal return is the 
reification of all history and future into an eternal present, and of all possible relations into 
the state of the self. It reduces the entire universe into a single totalizing narrative. 
 
Inasmuch as we cannot ourselves escape time, that is true; but our actions and 
entreaties have their corollaries outside time, in that heaven here described, which is a mode 
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of comprehending Creation from outside the structure of temporal progression, within the 
loving embrace of God. The essential difference in the two cosmologies is that for Williams 
there is still a dimension outside temporality that is accessible to us, and elsewhere he names 
the condition of a temporal state with access to eternity the City.  
 
Williams is fascinated by the problem of time: 
 
Time has been said to be the great problem for philosophers; nor is it otherwise with 
the believers. How, and with what, do we fill time? How, and how far, do we pass out 
of time? The apostates are only those who abandon the problem; the saints are only 
those who solve it. [Descent, 15] 
 
The solution, then, is to see time as one mode of perception of Creation, and thence to 
become able to shift into another, timeless, mode – in other words, to see the earth as heaven. 
By this formulation, Nietzsche is the arch-apostate; for not only does he abandon the problem 
of man’s relationship with time and hence eternity, he seeks to prove that it is in fact 
insoluble. His claim is that we cannot transcend time, and therefore we must seek to dominate 
it, to reduce all eternity to the confines of the self as will to power.  
 
But for Williams this is only a counsel of despair. He returns to this question in Many 
Dimensions, in which the Stone of Suleiman, among other properties, enables its bearer to 
travel in time. But time travel is a hazardous proposition.  
 
The danger arises when one attempts it with a synchronic conception of time as being 
a succession of moments, each monadically separate from all others. This privileges 
presence: indeed it privileges the present, for past and future become functions of an eternal 
present, folded into the always-now.  Then simple causality involves the time traveler in a 
horrific version of the Eternal Return: 
 
The difficulty… was absurdly simple, and consisted merely in the fact of the Stone 
itself. Supposing you willed to return a year, and to be again in those exact conditions, 
interior and exterior, in which you had been a year ago – why then, either you would 
have the Stone with you or you would not. If you had, you were not the same; if you 
had not, then how did you return, short of living through the intervening period all 
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over again? …. When you reached again this moment you would again return by 
virtue of the Stone – and so for ever. An infinite series of repetitions of those same 
few years, a being compelled to grow no older, a consciousness forbidden to expand 
or to die… five minutes’ return would be fatal….For if you willed yourself back you 
willed yourself precisely to be without the Stone; otherwise you were not back in the 
past as the past had truly been. And… the Stone would be purely logical. [MD, 52f.] 
 
The problem is one of consciousness, and here Williams demonstrates the limitations 
of Nietzsche’s conception of time. In the first place, the very process of traveling back in time 
would entail a complete negation of the traveler’s existence at any point after his decision to 
travel back. This is, indeed, what happens to the research assistant Elijah Pondon, who 
innocently performs that experiment and is lost to the world for days. He is only recalled via 
the expedient of a very different conception of time: a diachronic one, in which past, present 
and future are not so much moments, a succession of presents, but exist in and through each 
other – in Levinas’s playful phrase, “It’s today tomorrow”. As Critchley explains: 
 
…’synchrony’ is the bringing together, or understanding of phenomena within a 
 unified temporal order; for example, within the conception of time as a linear, infinite 
 series of punctual moments spread along the axes of past, present and future – what 
 one might call the spatial representation of time as a line, the abstract time of physics, 
 the time rendered immobile by Zeno’s paradoxes. In short, synchrony reduces time to 
 space. It is a conception of time that lets the past be recalled and the future 
 predicted. ‘Diachrony’, on the other hand, refers etymologically to the coming apart 
 of time, the inability to recall the succession of instants within memory or to predict 
 the instants to come. [Critchley, 165] 
 
Nietzsche’s time, therefore, is strictly synchronic, while Williams is concerned with 
the tension between the two conceptions of time. In his view, the created world unfolds 
synchronically, but heaven, being outside the temporal order, sees it diachronically. Hence 
man, with his feet firmly in Creation but his eyes set on heaven, must negotiate between the 
two. It is not a simple choice of one or the other, but rather a fundamental undecidability. 
That tension is a result of the fallen nature of man, as a being in the world. I shall have more 
to say on this in a later chapter, but what is relevant here is that how one perceives time has 
both practical and ethical ramifications.  
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Practically, one’s relationship with time informs how one lives. As Bodil Jönsson 
argues [Jönsson, 19], if time is viewed as a commodity to be used and manipulated it is 
reified and one ends with the equation Time=Money; but when one sees time as a continuous 
stream, then each moment is a snapshot of an unfolding process of growth. Nietzsche’s 
concept of eternal return makes time meaningless and valueless, infinitely exchangeable; 
Williams subscribes to a quite different conception of time, in which every moment of 
existence is non-reifiable, non-exchangeable, unique and therefore valuable in its own right. 
Say, rather, that Williams allows the Nietzschean will to power its dominion in time, but his 
own interest lies in the relation of man to eternity, which is a fundamentally ethical relation. 
Thus the narrative of the self caught in a perpetual present is located within a context that 
privileges that which is beyond the self, that is, the other. Nietzsche would render eternity 
into a function of the limits of the self; Williams opens up the self to the limitlessness of 
eternity.  
 
The third point of Nietzsche’s philosophy is that Christianity characterizes the things 
of the flesh as being sinful and wicked. Certainly that was a characteristic of many 
movements within the Church, and especially since the Reformation and into the modern era; 
but Williams would disagree – indeed he calls it “that fatal intellectual dichotomy which has 
done so much harm to Christendom.” [Forgiveness, 186] He sees it as a Manichaeistic notion, 
which “sprang from the contact of the Faith with the less reputable Greek metaphysics and 




The transfiguration of the earthly State into the heavenly City is a work of the Holy 
Ghost.... It does not involve, as the Manichaeans do vainly talk, a putting-off of the 
natural body, but it does involve that natural body itself becoming accustomed to a 
whole new set of laws. [ibid, 172] 
 
The redemption, then, is not merely physical but spiritual; indeed there can be no real 
separation of the two. Thus action on the physical level is also and always spiritual as well, 
and this, I contend, is the key to Williams’s philosophy, and his solution to the problems of 
postmodernity. For Williams the temporal existence of man is grounded in relation to a 
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transcendent eternity that is absolutely other. That relation can be expressed only within 
quotidian reality, for we are by nature unable to transcend our existence in time. To partake 
of eternity in time is a matter of relating to the other which is always beyond the self. Hence 
to commit the violence of reducing the other to a function of the self is to separate oneself 
from eternity; that is to say, to be condemned and die. 
 
Indeed, for Williams the physical is an index of the spiritual. Perhaps the best 
example of this is his description of Simon the Clerk in All Hallow’s Eve as a beetle-like 
imbecile: 
 
Into that corridor the figure, hovering on its shadowy platform, was about to recede; 
and below it all those inclined backs were on the point of similar movement. A crowd 
of winged beetles, their wings yet folded but at the very point of loosing, was about to 
rise into the air and disappear into that that crevice and away down the prolonged 
corridor. And that staring emaciated face that looked out at them and over them was 
the face of an imbecile. [AHE, 39] 
  
 These passages are the representation of a representation, for they depict a painting of 
Simon, and are all the more telling for that. Here Williams is at pains to indicate that the 
physical aspect of Simon’s moral decay is not presented merely as a convenient novelistic 
convention, but actually does exist for the characters of the text; and Jonathan, with his 
artist’s eye for the truth, is able semi-consciously to reflect the lack of the inner light of life 
that characterizes Simon the Clerk. 
 
 It is curious that Williams should apply the word ‘imbecile’ to Simon, for there is 
apparently no reason to assume a man stupid simply because he is bad; but for Williams there 
is a correlation. He does not believe, of course, that a great intellect makes man good, or the 
converse – but it is the application of the intellect to moral issues that is important. It makes 
man “more intelligent and more themselves” [Heaven, 31]. And therefore Simon is an 
imbecile, in the precise sense of his inability – or refusal – to apply what intellect he has to a 
moral questioning of his actions. 
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 It is clear, therefore, that Williams does not subscribe to the denigration of the 
physical of which Nietzsche accuses Christianity. His point is that man’s moral nature is 
inseparable from his body; indeed that it is an aspect of the body: 
 
[Our] physical natures awake thought and even in some sense think; they measure 
good and evil after their kind…. It is in our bodies that the secrets exist. Propitiation, 
expiation, forgiveness, are maintained there when the mind has explained them away 
– the need, the means, and the fruition. [FOS, 109] 
 
 The forgiveness of sins and the redemption of the soul are therefore not to be divorced 
from the operations of physical existence. The corollary to this, then, is that physical action 
always has a moral aspect to it. Quite neatly, therefore, Williams demonstrates the 
requirement for right action as well as right thought in the Christian system. It is not 
sufficient merely to repent of one’s sins; contrition requires a real and honest desire not to sin 
again, and implies an effort to that end. But that requirement is imposed by God, not man: 
 
[Pardon] is the name given to the heavenly knowledge of the evil of earth; evil is 
known as an occasion of good, that is, of love... mankind by itself could not endure 
the results of its choice, the total deprivation of good, and yet recover joyous 
awareness of good. What mankind could not do, manhood [i.e., Jesus] did... It was 
therefore possible now for mankind itself to know evil as an occasion of heavenly 
love. It was not inappropriate that the condition of such a pardon should be 
repentance, for repentance is no more than a passionate intention to know all things 
after the mode of heaven, and it is impossible to know evil as good if you insist on 
knowing it as evil.[Heaven, 59] 
 
 Forgiveness implies refusing to reduce the sinner to mere equation with the sin. It is a 
recognition that the human existence of the other has an ethical status quite separate from its 
interaction with the self. There is a world of difference here from Nietzsche’s conception of 
sin as a mechanism of control based on guilt. As guilt, sin cannot be forgiven or forgotten; 
that is why Williams insists that humans cannot demand contrition. The way of human 
forgiveness is to forgive unconditionally. Christian forgiveness, therefore, as the “turning of 
the cheek” does not result in domination. It is a refusal of the temptation of the power of 
domination. To be in a position to pardon means having power over the one who seeks 
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pardon, and to demand contrition is to place the other under the judgment of the self. Yet for 
Williams judgment properly belongs only to God, and hence the unconditional forgiveness of 
the Christian is a recognition that the self has no right to place ethical demands upon the 
other; in other words, that one may not reduce even the most abject and vicious sinner to the 
object of one’s own sense of justice, for to do so would be also to reduce him to an aspect of 
the narrative of the self. The arrogation of judgment to the self is the first perversion of 
justice, and the first step to the objectification of the other. It is the first movement of the 
totalitarian will.  
 
 Justice is impossible when the merely human self insists on justice. Vengeance is 
mine, saith the Lord; and the exact reciprocity of forgiveness in Williams’s vision reflects the 
temptations of power in the very heart of sanctity: 
 
No word in English carries a greater possibility of terror than the little word ‘as’ in 
that clause6; it is the measuring rod of the heavenly City, and the knot of the new 
union. But it is also the key of Hell and the knife that cuts the knot of union. The 
condition of forgiving then is to be forgiven; the condition of being forgiven is to 
forgive. The two conditions are co-existent; they are indeed the very point of 
coexistence, the root of the new union, the beginning of the recovery of the co-
inherence in which all creation had begun. Out of that point of double submission the 
City of God was to rise. [FOS, 157] 
 
 In other words, God’s forgiveness of our sins is conditional upon our forgiveness of 
the sins of others – not because it is withheld otherwise, but because not to forgive the sins of 
others is still to persist in the folly of wanting to know evil, “to know as gods”. Presuming to 
dispense justice makes a god of the self. Thus pardon is the enabling condition for pardon; in 
forgiving others we uphold the principle of justice that refuses to hold the other in its own 
place of power. The act of pardon is also an act of justice – indeed, the one just act of which 
man is capable– and it discharges the ethical call of the other. The first movement of justice 
for the other is the relinquishing of the power of the self. 
 
 
                                                 
6 From the Paternoster, of course: “Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us.” 
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 Williams’s Christianity, therefore, is not the weak abstract denigration of physical 
reality that Nietzsche attacks. It underpins a call to social justice, realized in concrete fashion 
within the relationship of man with God, man with man, man with Creation, man with all that 
is not his self. Such is Williams’s vision of what he calls the Co-inherence, the network of 
relationships that is the fundamental ground for ethical behaviour. Anything that extends and 
increases this network, then, is by nature good, for it represents an increase in the glory of the 
Co-inherence; that is to say, it reflects the ability of the self to relate fruitfully and ethically 
with that which is beyond itself. 
 
 Conversely, the only evil would be a sundering of relationships, a refusal to involve 
oneself in this great web of being and becoming. So much is clear from Descent Into Hell, 
Williams’s essay on the ultimate alienation of man from existence. Wentworth, the frustrated 
and bitter historian, enacts the descent of the title in his dreams, climbing down a rope into an 
abyss of his own making. His final alienation is from even himself, in a denouement that is 
the most terrifying in any of Williams’s work: 
 
He had now no consciousness of himself as such…. He was sitting at the end, looking 
up an avenue of nothingness, and the little flames licked his soul, but they did not now 
come from without, for they were the power, and the only power, his dead past had on 
him; the life, and the only life, of his soul. There was, at the end of the grand avenue, 
a bobbing shape of black and white that hovered there and closed it. As he saw it there 
came on him a suspense; he waited for something to happen. The silence lasted; 
nothing happened. In that pause expectancy faded. Presently then the shape went out 
and he was drawn, steadily, everlastingly, inward and down through the bottomless 
circles of the void. [DIH, 221-222] 
 
 Wentworth descends into a Hell of solipsism, and it seems that Williams would have 
considered such a Hell the likely end of the Übermensch. Wentworth does not arrive at this 
point by any considered denial of existence; he comes to his end through his desire for 
control, for the power to determine the conditions of his existence – in other words, through 
his will to power. Wentworth wanted to make all existence subordinate to his own, which is 
the project of the Übermensch, but it is a project that is based on the assumption that the 
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individual identity is a self-sufficient monad, an elementary particle indivisible and complete 
in itself without reference to any other entity. Williams would disagree. His claim is that 
identity is constituted precisely by participation in relationships with others; that one only 
knows one exists when one sees the face of the other and realizes the reciprocity of that gaze. 
If the only essential identity is that of the self, that self dissolves, into a Hell of absolute and 
total oblivion. Williams here turns the Nietzschean position back upon itself. The 
Übermensch is supposed to be the ultimate realization of the powers and potential of man, but 
Williams shows that it is the ultimate defeat and death of man, an annihilation beyond even 
the ability of the eternal return to redeem.  
 
 Williams thus articulates a powerful message of resistance against the forces of 
domination and hence totalitarianism. Whether at the political or the personal level, 
Nietzsche’s work suggests that the only way to full human self-realisation is to place all 
others at the feet of the self, to inscribe one’s personal narrative upon the being of the Other. 
Williams suggests that the ultimate outcome of such an approach is not self-realisation but 
self-abnegation; say rather self-destruction. By annihilating the Other one annihilates the self. 
But by facing the Other, by refusing the temptation to dominate, indeed by placing oneself at 
the feet of another in the exchange of mutual forgiveness, the self locates itself within a larger 







Being and Eternity: Heidegger and Williams 
 
Martin Heidegger is one of the great figures of twentieth-century philosophy. His major 
contribution to thought is in the field of phenomenology, the analysis of the relationship 
between the noumenal and the phenomenal; in his words, between Sein and Dasein, essential 
Being and beings as they are encountered.  
 
 Heidegger’s phenomenology has been central to philosophical debate since the 
publication of Being and Time. Most commentary on it has focused upon locating it within 
the Western traditions of philosophy, and on its implications for ontology. Comparatively 
little has been written on the ethical aspects of Heidegger’s thought, for two very good 
reasons – firstly, he explicitly subordinates ethics to the ontological question, which must be 
answered before one can consider its application; secondly, and more problematically, his 
involvement with National Socialism coloured reception of his work, and perhaps motivated 
a major ‘turn’ (Kehne) in his approach, making it difficult to pin down exactly what he may 
have thought at different points in his life. 
 
 There is considerable controversy over just how much of a Nazi Heidegger was, if at 
all, but it is not my intention to become entangled in that particular debate. Instead, following 
Hatab, I wish to focus on the ethics implied by Heidegger’s early work, which is independent 
of his political orientation and indeed to a large degree in conflict with it. It should be noted, 
however, that some of it has been used to justify the Nazi project, albeit unconvincingly. 
 
 Despite his association with the most notorious of totalitarian states, Heidegger’s 
work does not come across, in the way Nietzsche’s does, as supporting totalitarian attitudes. 
Indeed there is much in it that suggests the opposite, and which lays the groundwork for the 
later work of Derrida and Levinas in the realm of ethics. This is in large part due to the 
success of Heidegger’s phenomenological project. By opening up the entire question of being 
(not that he comes to a really satisfactory conclusion), he enables new modes of thinking 
about how the self relates to the world around it. These new modes of thought have tended to 
destabilize accepted notions of ethical relation, and hence are of primary importance to this 
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discussion. It will be necessary to examine the basics of the project at length, before we can 
examine its relation to Williams’s work. 
 
 To begin with Heidegger’s starting point, then, the phenomenological approach seeks 
to reveal phenomena in the way that they are concretely experienced by the subject, or, as 
Heidegger names it, Dasein. Dasein differs from the Cartesian subject in that it is being-in-
the-world, already shaped before the act of observation by moods, practical concerns, 
physical limitations, social and cultural background, in other words by its context. This is not 
all: for Dasein “existence” is “essence” [Heidegger: 1962, 67]. What Heidegger means by 
this is that Dasein is involved in the world not as a detached self that is separate from the 
phenomena it experiences, but rather as a way of coming into being that is implicated by 
those phenomena. Dasein, therefore, is prior to the self. 
 
 The next movement in Heidegger’s phenomenology is to distinguish between the 
ontical and the ontological. The ontical refers to particular beings; the ontological to the 
Being of beings in general. This he names Sein. There is a profound negativity in the 
relationship between Sein and Dasein: even the totality of all beings in existence does not 
encompass Being. Through Being, the world is disclosed in its finitude; hence, Being is itself 
“essentially finite” [Heidegger: 1993, 108]. Thus there is a double absence, or excess – first 
the part of Being that cannot be encompassed by any being, and secondly, by the finitude of 
Being itself.  
 
 Heidegger contrasts his notion of Dasein with more traditional notions of being. 
Generally being has been thought of as a positive content, defined and delimited by one 
philosophical concept or another. The quintessential example of this is the Cartesian subject, 
which is a detached observer of a universe fundamentally separate from itself. Dasein, 
however, is distinguished by its being in-the-world. It cannot be understood except within its 
context. Thus the basic mode of encounter for Dasein is care (Besorgen): 
 
 Having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and 
 looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go…. 
 [Heidegger: 1962, 83] 
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 Care inaugurates anxiety (Angst), which arises when Dasein becomes aware of its 
own ultimate possibility – that is, the possibility that it should fulfill its purpose for existence, 
its telos –  and thus becomes aware as well that its current state is one of the absence of that 
possibility. That awareness is being-towards-death, death being the negation of meaning. 
Without meaning, there is no being, hence no life. The encounter with meaninglessness 
therefore is the existential contrast that reveals meaning. Anxiety thus describes the moment 
when Dasein attains self-consciousness and thereby becomes alienated from the world 
(Unheimlich). That moment reveals the possibility of meaning, but also its absence. This 
disjunction discloses the “radical finitude” [Hatab, 25] of Dasein. 
 
 Dasein must come to terms with its own radical finitude, the negativity that is its base. 
Heidegger names this coming to terms authenticity. The self is not positive content, but 
negative transcendence, and Dasein moves towards authenticity when it faces squarely the 
condition of its own being. It is opposed to the inauthentic familiar modes of understanding 
of the self which Heidegger calls das Man. Here we have the ethical turn: das Man names the 
reifying social-cultural-political myths that enclose and inhibit the true coming-to-being of 
Dasein. Authenticity, therefore, as a response to the “voice of conscience” [Heidegger: 1962, 
330], is opposed to all totalising narratives that seek to reduce the individual, unique Dasein 
to a general being. 
 
 What is important here is that Heidegger does not claim that das Man is an evil. It 
serves as a starting-point, which must then be modified in the direction of authentic Dasein. 
Indeed das Man is a description of the authentic being of a self: only that self is not those 
selves that encounter it. The movement towards authenticity takes place on the margins of the 
self as described by das Man. It is a non-terminating search: being is always a becoming. The 
end of that process is terminal, that is, death. Being is being-towards-death. Death, then, is 
the culmination of being, is true life: the moment of annihilation is the moment of 
authenticity achieved. It is this dynamic of being and death that Williams explores in All 
Hallow’s Eve. 
 
 All Hallow’s Eve begins with death – two deaths, in fact, at least of the physical sort. 
Two young women, Lester and Evelyn, are killed by a falling aeroplane. Though they are 
physically dead, their consciousness remains. Lester quickly comes to terms with her death, 
as the condition of her being, but Evelyn seeks incessantly to deny it. In Heideggerian terms, 
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Lester’s response reflects the movement towards authenticity, and Evelyn’s the betrayal of 
authenticity in a stubborn insistence on das Man. A moment’s reflection would reveal the 
truth to her, yet she refuses to countenance the possibility, remaining trapped in a discourse 
that finds meaning only in positive signification and cannot recognise the value of negativity. 
It is the role of phenomenology to inspire this moment’s reflection, but unfortunately Evelyn 
does not have recourse to its resources.  
 
 Even more unfortunately, she is denied the basic phenomena of life. Being physically 
dead, she can derive no satisfaction from her senses. All that is left of her is will, and the only 
way that she can find to exert that will is to dominate another. The shade of the will to power 
arises again – and indeed Evelyn seeks to indulge that will in petty yet utterly vicious cruelty. 
She seeks someone to have by her side for all eternity, to torture and to oppress by the 
exercise of her will. Her attempt fails, and she is left to wander, ironically immortal, utterly 
insane: having no other to vent its spite upon, her being is stuck forever in its state of self-
directed rancour. She is alive, in a sense; but that life is meaningless, painfully futile. It is 
Hell. 
 
 On the other hand, Lester, having thwarted diverse sorcerous plans – including 
Evelyn’s – goes to her death: 
 
…the approach of all the hallows possessed her, and she too, into the separations and 
unions which are indeed its approach, and into the end to which it is itself an 
approach, was wholly gone. The tremor of brightness received her. [AHE, 269] 
 
 For Lester, separation is also union; being finds its true Being – Dasein coming into 
Sein – only in death. By giving her self up to dissolution, Lester affirms the ultimate truth of 
that very self. However, she is not annihilated; her existence in temporality is at an end, but 
she lives in heaven, which is being-towards-God. It is a movement of the self towards that 
which exceeds even the fullest expression of authentic being, which indeed is the very 
condition of the fulfillment of being. Radical finitude dissolves in union with the infinitude of 
the Omnipotence; there can be no other way. 
 
 Returning to Heidegger, we can see that the self of Dasein, as radical finitude and 
thus both ungrounded and ungroundable, is never full presence. This, rather than merely 
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inspiring anxiety, also frees human beings from metaphysical, reductive, totalising 
formulations of their being. Freedom from reduction is also freedom for possibility. As Hatab 
argues: 
 
 Since the being of the self is a kind of negativity implicated with absence, we are 
 wrong when we try to reduce people to fixed or closed essences without remainder or 
 otherness… to see the human person in nonessential terms is to refuse all reductions, 
 to weigh potentiality more than actuality… What humans ultimately have in common, 
 then, is the negativity of finitude, the fact that we do not ultimately have a definable 
 “essence”… all the abstract categories of race, gender, role, et al…. can be interrupted 
 by a negative correction. [Hatab, 180] 
 
 In other words, whatever categories we place another human being in, his or her 
authentic being always exceeds that signification. The very nature of being guarantees this. It 
is interesting to note the discourse of race in Williams with regard to this point: he quite 
consciously makes it an issue in several of his novels, yet rarely in a straightforward way.  
 
 A key early example is the figure of Inkamasi, the Zulu chieftain in Shadows of 
Ecstasy. The novel chronicles a war that is the stuff of white-supremacists’s nightmares: the 
“black hordes” of Africa rise to overthrow their imperial oppressors. It turns out that the war 
is being orchestrated by a white sorcerer, Nigel Considine, who has plans of his own. Thus 
far the present-day reader might be excused for dismissing the novel as another offering from 
the school of Edgar Rice Burroughs or Rudyard Kipling, all condescending racism: the blacks 
could not possibly have organized an uprising all on their own! Yet consider Inkamasi, who 
begins by supporting Considine, but in no simple-minded way. With great dignity, he 
emphasizes that “… I do not want to help Considine, though I long for Africa to be free.” 
[SE, 112] His statement intimates that Williams is not about to portray him merely as another 
noble savage. The truth is rather more complex. 
 
 Inkamasi is the true king of the Zulu, and his bearing reflects it. His very being labels 
as folly Considine’s machinations, and gives the lie to all corrupt political systems: 
 
 The kingship which Inkamasi so proudly held had here [in the violence of the riot] 
 its apish rival in savage might and dextrous cunning; yet that kingship was 
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 unstained, as all lovely things are unstained by their detestable imitations, since 
 beauty cannot be manifested unless the mind assents. Without that assent, beauty 
 itself must be tyranny; but with that grave acceptance there is no government that  is 
 not beautiful, for love is not only the fulfilling but the beginning of the law. 
 [SE, 161] 
 
 Love, here, is an unlimited joy and wonder at the other, at what exceeds signification. 
Heidegger names it empathy (Einfühlung), an “ethically authentic dwelling-in-the-midst-of-
finitude that discloses the meaning depth and appropriate particularity of a given existential 
situation.” [Hatab, 151] It is the finite being’s only access to infinitude, for it allows the self 
to apprehend – though not encompass – the infinite alterity of the Other. Inkamasi’s kingship 
is “lovely” because it does not seek to reduce its subjects to merely that, but is profoundly 
aware of their status as beings, irreducible and full of possibility. There is an exchange of 
loving regard, and this exchange underpins the “assent” that is root and branch of the law – 
that is, ethical behaviour between human beings.  
 
 Inkamasi thus demonstrates a kingship that is fundamentally the stewardship of the 
alterity of being. His duty is to preserve the space of possibility for his people, to protect 
them from domination by any reductive, totalising discourse. Such a discourse is Considine’s 
plan. He seeks personal power through the exercise of political power; but his motives are 
purely self-centred.  
 
 Considine is a fanatical believer in himself; inasmuch as his followers are fanatics, he 
is yet the strongest in his belief. In this at least he is sincere: just as his followers see him as 
Master over Death, he so believes himself. It is precisely because of this belief that he has 
been able to extend his lifespan over two centuries – “It is two hundred years since I was 
born, and how near am I to-night to any kind of natural death?” [SE, 74] – also to need little 
food and sleep. His impressive powers stem from that deep faith in the self that he claims to 
wish to reveal to the world; yet what he does not say is that few would ever be able to achieve 
them. So much is clear from clues that he lets slip – that the soldiers have achieved “all that 
they are capable of”; that “things [he’d] discovered with pain were taught to the priestly 
initiates [but] they held them secret and were afraid of them” [SE, 203] – but in his more 
conscious rhetoric he suggests that these gifts are for the edification of all mankind: “…the 
Allied Supremacies appeal to the whole world for belief and discipleship and devotion…. 
 37
Know exaltation and feed on it; in the strength of such food man shall enter into his 
kingdom.” [SE, 41f]  
 
 It is in the nature of the totalitarian state that it should reduce its constituents to 
functions within itself; the nature of the totalitarian ruler is to reduce his subjects to adjuncts 
of his self. In each case, the subject’s will is dominated: Considine does it through hypnosis, 
but propaganda and mob psychology work as well. The being of the subject is reified, and 
loses consciousness of its own alterity, becoming obsessed with the few concerns allowed it 
by the dominating narrative. These concerns are of the order of Evelyn’s petty cruelty (in All 
Hallow’s Eve): to be limited to them is to suffer annihilation. This fate is what Inkamasi 
resists; his resistance leads to his death.  
 
 Ironically, in the aftermath of the war 
 
An encouraging but slightly vague account appeared in the Press of how a British 
patriot, who preferred his Imperial birthright to his Zulu birthright, had shot Considine 
while being pressed to join him. It was understood that he had deliberately sacrificed 
himself in order to help England, and a good deal of quiet (and not too quiet) pride 
was felt that it was an English subject, or at least a Dominion subject, who had acted 
so…. Such was the spirit produced by the British occupation. [SE, 220] 
  
 Inkamasi is sadly reduced by the propaganda of the imperial power to a good subject 
willing to sacrifice his being for the sake of the “Imperial birthright”. It is obvious that he has 
been none such: his sacrifice was precisely for his kingly Zulu birthright. The “terrific 
cheers” that greet the prime minister’s speech announcing the death of Considine suggest 
that, after all, the English are not so different from the Africans in being susceptible to the 
blandishments of a self-serving demagogue. Considine and the PM Suydler are mirrors to 
each other in their cynical manipulation of the masses for personal gain; hence, the masses 
they lead are mirrors also. It is illuminating to note the qualification of Inkamasi’s status, 
from English to “Dominion” subject. The English people do not wish to have it revealed that 
a black man could be of equal political standing as them, nor do they wish to admit to the 
possibility that they owe their survival to the African. Thus, even within the triumphant 
propaganda, there is an eruption of fear that is suppressed only by the cheers. 
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 Williams, then, exposes the basic weakness of humans, regardless of racial 
provenance, in betraying their authentic selves by following the dictates of the dominating 
power. The pride they take in their servility extends to celebration of the reduction of another 
to that servility. All that is outside the dominant narrative must be reduced; otherwise there is 
a danger that they may be forced to recognize the value of the Other. This is the triumph of 
totalitarianism, when those who are subject to it find their only meaning and value in 
supporting it, and do not admit the possibility (indeed, the infinite possibilities) of what lies 
outside its ideology. 
 
 Yet being is always already implicated with community. Dasein becomes self-
conscious within the context of das Man. What is the response of authentic being to the 
ideologies that inform it? How does Dasein break out of the self-Other dichotomy that seeks 
to reduce the Other? Heidegger suggests an answer in his concept of empathy. He writes: 
 
 … the question at issue concerns the possibility of man’s transposing himself into 
 another being that he himself is not. In this connection self-transposition does not 
 mean the factical transference of the existing human being into the interior of another 
 being. Nor does it mean the factical substitution of oneself for another being so as to 
 take its place. On the contrary, the other being is precisely supposed to remain what it 
 is and how it is…. This moment does not consist in our simply forgetting ourselves as 
 it were and trying our utmost to act as if we were the other being. On the contrary, it 
 consists precisely in we ourselves being precisely ourselves, and only in this way first 
 bringing about the possibility of ourselves being able to go along with the other being 
 while remaining other with respect to it. [quoted in Hatab, 143] 
 
 Empathy, then, seems to describe what Williams calls co-inherence, a crucial concept 
in his theology and his later novels. It is the basis of the Doctrine of Substituted Love, as 
Williams names it in Descent into Hell. Its protagonist, Pauline Anstruther, lives in fear of a 
döppelganger that seems to follow her, coming nearer each time she sees it. Fortunately she 
makes the acquaintance of the poet Peter Stanhope, who offers to bear her fears. It is an offer 
she cannot understand: it seems absurd for one person to feel fear in another’s place. Yet his 
is precisely the Doctrine of Substituted Love that she must learn, and Stanhope insists: 
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“To bear a burden is precisely to carry it instead of… if you will be part of the best of 
us, and live and laugh and be ashamed with us, then you must be content to be helped. 
You must give your burden up to someone else, and you must carry someone else’s 
burden.” [DH, 98f.] 
 
 There is no impropriety in exchange; it is to be freely offered, freely accepted, and the 
acceptance is every bit as important as the offer. And when Pauline does accept his aid, she 
finds herself free for perhaps the first time in her life from fear. He takes on her fear, feels it 
for her, and sets her free. One thing only he cannot take on – “He endured her sensitiveness, 
but not her sin; the substitution there, if indeed there is a substitution, is hidden in the central 
mystery of Christendom which Christendom itself has never understood, nor can.” [DH, 101] 
Fear and love may be exchanged, may be substituted for; but the burden of sin has been borne 
once and for all by Christ on the Cross, and so there is no need for man to attempt to bear 
what he cannot. Free from her fear, then, Pauline makes a promise: 
 
It had been compelled, she had been commanded; a god had been with her – not Peter 
Stanhope, but whatever had answered him from her depth…. He and whatever he 
meant by the Omnipotence would manage it quite well between them. Perhaps, later 
on, she could give the Omnipotence a hand with some other’s burden; everyone 
carrying everyone else’s, like the Scilly Islanders taking in each other’s washing. 
Well, and at that, if it were tiresome and horrible to wash your own clothes and easy 
and happy to wash someone else’s, the Scilly Islanders might be intelligent enough. 
“Change here for Scilly,” she said aloud as she came to the gate. [DH, 107f.] 
 
 She has stumbled upon what Williams elsewhere refers to as “the moral mathematics 
of the glory” [Heaven, 35], and it is a good thing that she has, for it is at this point that the 
strange Lily Sammile appears to tempt her: Lily offers her utter happiness, in a dream world 
completely subject to the dreamer’s desires; the ultimate in wish fulfillment, with the one 
proviso that this dream world will be exclusive to the dreamer alone. Sammile couches this 
condition in terms of a desirable effect: “You’ll never have to do anything for others any 
more.” [DH, 110] 
 
 Up to the moment Sammile says this, Pauline has indeed been tempted by the 
prospect of an even greater happiness than she has experienced thus far; but it is precisely the 
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idea that she will never have to do anything for others that breaks the spell. She has sworn an 
oath to herself, that “she would carry someone else’s parcel as hers had been carried, that she 
would be what he said she could.” [DH, 111] She would willingly be obligated, happily take 
on a heavy load, for that is the right order in the universe she has just discovered: 
Perjury, on her soul and in her blood, if now she slipped to buy sweets with money 
that was not hers; never till it was hers in all love and princely good, by gift exchange, 
law of the universe and herself a child of the universe…. An oath, an oath, an oath in 
heaven, and heaven known in the bright oath itself, where two loves struck together, 
and the serene light of substitution shone, beyond her understanding but not beyond 
her deed. She flung the gate shut, and snatched her hands away, and as it clanged she 
was standing upright, her body a guard flung out at the frontiers of her soul. [DH, 
111-112] 
 
 The great challenge to Pauline’s newfound faith has been met. She has become an 
adept of the Doctrine, and it is as well, for there is a task awaiting her. She is, as she has 
promised, to bear the burden of others. 
 
 The first is her martyred ancestor John Struther, cringing in his cell at the thought of 
the flames soon to consume him; the second is an unnamed workman, a suicide driven to 
despair by the injustices of the world. She is to bear directly the fears of her ancestor, but also 
she is to aid the orphan soul in his own path towards salvation. In her journey she crosses 
between the realms, to keep “The Tryst of the Worlds”, as Williams’s chapter title has it. In 
the world of the spirits, she meets the workman, on his way to London. He has himself 
already discovered the workings of divine grace, for he was a decent man in life and has 
served his time of purgation, and at that the end of that time has found salvation in the Cross: 
 
 The dead man also felt it…. He only moaned a little, a moan not quite of pain, but 
 of intention and the first faint wellings of recognized obedience and love. All his past 
 efforts of good temper and kindness were in it; they had seemed to  be lost; and they 
 lived…. another moan answered it. The silence groaned….  The dead man felt it and 
 was drawn back away from that window into his own world of being, where also 
 something moaned and was free. The groan was at once dereliction of power and 
 creation of power. In it, far off, beyond vision in the depths of all the worlds, a god, 
 unamenable to death, awhile endured and died. [DH, 124] 
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 Yet still he needs this little piece of aid. He wishes to know the way to the City. 
Pauline, in her new compassion, offers him shelter for the night, fare for a bus in the 
morning; but he will have none of it. He only wishes to know the way. She points it out at 
last, and he thanks her, “lifting his cap again in an archangelic salute to the Mother of God” 
[DH, 166]. Though she does not realize it, Pauline has aided a blessed soul.  
 
 For a moment she almost regrets all she had done, for a premonition tells her that she 
is about to meet her double once again. She runs in fear – to see in her path a figure, a man 
crying out the name of God in anguish. It is John Struther, in a crisis of faith as he faces the 
stake. “The moment of goodwill in which she had directed to the City the man who had but 
lately died had opened to her the City itself, the place of the present and all the past.” [DH, 
169] He is agonizing over his fate, the temptation to recant and save his life, and he is 
wracked by fear. Yet already his prayers have been heard and answered: 
 
 In front of her, in his foul Marian [a reference to Mary Queen of Scots] prison, 
 unaware of the secret means the Lord he worshipped was working swiftly for his 
 grace, believing and unbelieving, her ancestor stood centuries off in his spiritual 
 desolation and preluding agony of sweat. He could not see beyond the years the child 
 of his house who strove with herself behind and before him. [DH, 170]  
 
 Pauline hears her own voice say, “Give it to me, John Struther,” and with those words 
he is saved. He falls to his knees, roaring in triumph the words for which he will be 
remembered in centuries to come, “I have seen the salvation of my God.” [DH, 170] 
 
 The voice, of course, comes from her double, but she knows no fear now. She has 
seen it for what it is – herself, in the very act of substitution. It is no longer other, for the fear 
she has been bearing all this time has been the fear of John Struther, and now she may release 
that burden. At that, Pauline turns to look her double face to face – to look herself in the eye. 
She realizes that  
 
 It had been her incapacity for joy, nothing else, that had till now turned the 
 vision of herself aside; her incapacity for joy had admitted fear, and fear had 
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 imposed separation. She knew now that all acts of love are the measure of capacity 
 for joy; its measure and its preparation, whether the joy comes or delays. [DH, 171] 
 
 Joy is the emotion of being-towards-death, the self recognising its own radical 
finitude and rejoicing in the negativity of its existence. In its experience of joy, Dasein breaks 
free from positive signification and literally realizes the impossibility of its infinite 
possibility. Moreover, it does so in the face of the Other, which reveals the overflow of being 
from signification. Pauline’s döppelganger is her authentic self going-along-with her being. 
The moment of integration is the moment of death that Pauline has feared for so long; but 
that death is a release into authentic existence, the freeing of being into negativity. 
 
 As Hatab suggests, the contribution of Heidegger’s notion of finitude is that it gives 
the lie to the metaphysics of presence. The myth of pure presence suggests the possibility of 
an absolute good divorced from the conditions of humanity. Heidegger suggests that this is 
not only philosophically untenable but morally pernicious. “Good”, then, is good action 
within a specific context. It is a mode of being that is inseparable from the process of 
becoming, or coming-into-being. Goodness is the realisation of the authentic being of Dasein.  
 
 It is instructive to read Williams in the light of such a concept of goodness. His 
movement away from the metaphysics of presence – a move that is demonstrated clearly in 
The Greater Trumps – implies an ethical complex bound up with radical finitude. It is 
precisely the limits of man that call up, and call out for, the practice of ethics. Man cannot 
and should not attempt to master being: 
 
 Man does not decide whether and how beings appear…. The advent of beings lies in 
 the destiny of being. But for man it is ever a question of finding what is fitting in his 
 essence that corresponds to such destiny; for in accord with this destiny man as ek-
 sisting has to guard the truth of being. Man is the shepherd of being. [Heidegger: 
 1993, 234] 
 
 The ethics of Being offers a powerful resource for the reading of Williams’s novels, 
but leaves certain issues without address. Most troubling perhaps is its reliance on the 
concept of an original transcendent presence that underlies all phenomenal being.  
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 The first objection to this formulation would be that it represents a disguised return to 
the metaphysics of presence. Although Heidegger declares that his phenomenology 
inaugurates the end of metaphysics, the very notion of Being represents a concept that is 
made present in beings: that is, Sein can only be through Dasein. The transcendence of 
Being, therefore, is always already mediated by its exposure through beings. Heidegger’s 
phenomenology of Being thus begs the question – how does one know that there is in fact 
one unitary Being of all beings? Could the consciousness of each being not finally be unique, 
alone and separate from all other beings; in other words, might Being itself be structured as 
other than itself? 
 
 A second, related objection thus arises. If the first objection is philosophical, the 
second is ethical. If Being is the transcendental ground or origin of beings, it follows that the 
fates of individual beings are subordinate to the destiny of Being. It is clear to the 
contemporary reader just how pernicious such a concept can be, for it is easy to reduce the 
destiny of Being to a specific ideological eschatology. This is precisely what Heidegger did 
in his infamous Rectoral Address of 1933. His valourisation of the German Volk is little short 
of jingoism; far more disturbingly, he goes on to state that “the individual, wherever he may 
stand, counts for nothing; the destiny of our people in its state counts for everything.” [cited 
in Hatab, 202] The ethics of Being becomes a justification for the suppression of individual 
existence in favour of communitarian destiny. 
 
 It is thus possible to articulate a third objection. The emphasis on – and privileging of 
– transcendental Being as opposed to phenomenal beings supports a type of aestheticism that 
tends to ignore the specific experience of the individual. Specifically, and most damagingly, 
it makes it possible to objectify suffering. The most egregious examples come from 
Heidegger’s later writing, in which he compares modern agriculture with the Holocaust. His 
point concerned the application of industrial processes to the manufacture of product; well 
and good, but there is something quite inappropriate about the declaration that the production 
of food is “in essence” the same as the production of corpses. He has a point – but the point is 
made only at the cost of viewing the killing of persons as a productive process. Few people 
(even moral philosophers) would feel comfortable arguing that the Holocaust was intended to 
feed anything other than the nihilistic sadism of the Nazi state. Perhaps the death of millions 
of people did in some sense “feed” the Being of the Volk; one wonders if there were some 
other way of realising its destiny. 
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 Another example is quite as damning: Heidegger insists in Poetry, Language, 
Thought that the “real plight” of dwelling is the alienation of human being from a primal 
dwelling with Being, and that this is a greater cause for concern than, say, a lack of affordable 
housing forcing people to live in shanty towns. One suspects that it is rather easier to anguish 
about being alienated from Being in the comfort of an overstuffed armchair than while 
huddled against a clammy draught. It appears that Heidegger’s concern with metaphysical 
authenticity led him into very shaky ground indeed. Williams has a pithy answer to this: 
 
The easy talk of mental distress being worse than physical may occasionally be true; 
only occasionally. Most men would prefer a month’s mental distress to a month’s 
serious neuralgia. [FOS, 109] 
 
 Such is the essence of Adorno’s devastating critique of “The Jargon of Authenticity”, 
which he claims serves as a cover for disguised ideology. For Adorno, “the jargon of 
authenticity is ideology as language, without any consideration of specific content.” [Adorno 
1973, 132] In its obsession with authentic Being, it subordinates individual existence into the 
ostensibly more essential destiny of Dasein. Thus, that destiny becomes open to definition by 
the powers that be, such that the individual can only find meaning through sacrifice to that 
essence. This, Adorno claims, is the real meaning of the being-towards-death: 
 
 The worn-out principle of the self-positing of the ego, which proudly holds out in 
 preserving its life at the cost of the others, is given a higher value by means of the 
 death which extinguishes it. What was once the portal to eternal life has been closed 
 for Heideggerian philosophy…. In the worst instance it is the convention that 
 sanctions death by means of the thought of divine will and divine grace – even after 
 theology has pined away. That is what is being exploited by language, and what 
 becomes the schema of the jargon of authenticity. Its dignified is a reactionary 
 response toward the secularization of death. Language wants to grasp what is 
 escaping, without believing or naming it. Naked death becomes the meaning of such 
 talk – a meaning that otherwise it would have only in something transcendent…. That 
 is why meaning is thrown into death. [Adorno 1973, 133f.] 
 
 45
 Death, as a moment of the destiny of Dasein, is no longer holy – that is, apart. Yet for 
Williams, death is not secularized. Indeed, it cannot be, for it is precisely what separates man 
from the divine: “The law was precisely impossible. Man precisely was not in a situation; he 
was, himself, the contradiction; he was, himself, death-in-life and life-in-death. He was 
incompetent.” [DOD, 66] Man’s profanity lies in the very fact that his being is being-
towards-death. The problem of the Heideggerian conception of death, and being-towards-
death, is that it reduces the death of the individual to a point in a larger narrative. That is so 
for Williams as well, but the crucial difference lies in Williams’s belief in an originary 
narrative, cleaving unto which is the telos of man. That is the Christ story: 
 
 Christianity has gone further. It has proclaimed that the Omnipotence recognised that 
 responsibility in the beginning and from the beginning, and acted on it – not by 
 infusing grace only but by himself becoming what himself had made, in the condition 
 to which it had, by his consent, brought itself. It is this particular act, done of free 
 choice and from love, which makes the faith unique.... It has asserted the indivisible 
 union of the two natures in the single Person. It has asserted that this union accepted 
 responsibility; at the hand of God himself God has required the life of man. [Heaven, 
 99] 
 
 In other words, the Being that we partake of in being-towards-death is none other than 
that of Christ Himself. And the crucial difference – the difference, that is, which constitutes 
the Cross – is that the sacrifice, the death, is not accomplished for the mere sake of fulfilling 
the destiny of Being. It is a voluntary, even an absurd act of love. It has nothing at all to do 
with the being of the same, but is directed to the other: 
 
 The taunt flung at that Christ, at the moment of his most spectacular impotency, was: 
 ‘He saved others; himself he cannot save.’ It was a definition as precise as any in the 
 works of the medieval schoolmen.... It was an exact definition of the kingdom of 
 heaven in operation, and of the great discovery of substitution which was then made 
 by earth. [Heaven, 83] 
 
 What matters, then, is an intention for the other, which makes death holy. It is this 
dying to the self that is the true fulfillment of being-towards-death, and thus it does not 
always necessitate physical death. The intent of substitution is sufficient: thus we see, in 
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Descent into Hell, Pauline Anstruther’s substitution for John Struther and her confrontation 
with her döppelganger. The self does not seek destruction; suicide is not authentic being-
towards-death, as the example of the workman clearly demonstrates. Dying to the self means 
being for the Other, whose destiny is wholly apart from that of the same.  
 
 In concluding this chapter, therefore, we may see that Heidegger’s work offers rich 
resources for the analysis of being, but is not unproblematic. To use those resources requires 
considerable supplementation – a good deal of which may be derived from writers working 
(whether consciously or not) out of a Jewish tradition. Chapter Three invokes two – Jacques 





The Closure of Ethics: Williams and the ethical demands of deconstruction 
 
 The problems inherent in Heideggerian discourse should not discourage us from 
making full use of its insights, which are remarkable and valuable; however, in the task of 
reading Williams in the fullness of his ethical positions, it requires copious supplementation. 
This supplementation can be found in the application of deconstruction to ethics in the works 
of Derrida and Levinas. Following Critchley, I shall argue that, contrary to much popular 
opinion, deconstruction is inextricably bound up with an ethical demand. Derrida’s work does 
not engage directly with that demand, but that of Levinas does; thus, this chapter will attempt 
to elucidate the results of their encounters with each other, with Heidegger and with 
Nietzsche, and hence the implications towards an ethical reading of Williams. To set the 
stage for these encounters, however, we must first examine the basic tenets of deconstruction, 
and its relation to Williams’s work. 
 
Deconstruction is ultimately an attack on metaphysics, which for Derrida is any 
system that privileges presence over representation. A system is metaphysical to the extent 
that it claims the concept to be “a moment of pure presence” [Hart, 12] and that, in the 
absence of the concept, the sign represents that moment. Thus, the act of signing is an attempt 
to inscribe presence within a text. In his indictment of the metaphysics of presence, however, 
Derrida claims that the failure of representation is a structural function of the process of 
representation itself.  
 
It is essential to the operation of a sign that it must be repeatable, and repeatable in 
different contexts; as well, a sign only exists as a sign in the absence of its originating 
presence. Signing is only meaningful if the originary presence is not itself apprehensible, and 
the sign must operate in all contexts in which the presence is not. Presence corresponds to the 
intelligible (that which is apprehended by the objective abstract mind) and sign to the sensible 
(that which is apprehended through the subjective agency of the senses) – but the point at 
stake here is that the intelligible is always mediated through the sensible. Since there is, for 
Derrida, no means of communication except through the agency of the senses, there can be 
no direct knowledge of the intelligible. Instead, presence is always already (déja la) 
conditioned by the inherent limitations of the sense, and – more damningly – by the very 
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mode of subjectivity. Since, then, there can be no a posteriori knowledge of presence, the 
very status of presence is called into question.  
 
There are two modes of repetition addressed by deconstruction: the first, which is 
intended by discourse, is that by which the sign repeats presence; but the second involves the 
repetition of the sign itself, as a sensible mark. This is a necessary attribute; else the sign 
could not function. But since the sign depends for its identity on presence, which is absent 
(else there would be no need for the sign), it has no ability to define itself within different 
contexts, thus opening the door to re-representation and mis-representation. Thus, no context 
can completely determine a sign; its meaning changes with different contexts. In other words, 
a sign is not totalisable within a single context, or even any finite constellation of contexts. 
One must always allow for the possibility of alternate meanings. Alterity, then, is a structural 
feature of all signs.  
 
 The implication here is that the second mode of repetition serves to enforce the failure 
of the first mode. If the sign cannot hold its meaning (that is, its representation of presence) 
stable, then the attempt to repeat the originary presence is doomed. And since the very 
condition of a sign’s existence as a sign is repeatability, there can be no question of fixing the 
context. The condition of its possibility is at one and the same time the condition of its 
failure. Furthermore, since there is no way in which we can apprehend the pure presence 
apart from this failed representation, it is clear that the presence does not exist within 
discourse. There is only the trace of a presence. And since the presence has never actually 
revealed itself throughout this process, we can strictly speak only of a trace of a trace, for we 
have no knowledge even of the origin of the trace. Within such a representational economy, 
then, repetition is prior to presence. 
 
It should be noted here that Derrida is not interested in skepticism. The skeptical 
argument is basically that, since there is no single agreed ground of knowledge, and hence 
one cannot be said to know anything beyond doubt, one cannot be said to know anything at 
all. Critchley points out that “the history of philosophy [can be understood] as a series of 
repeated refutations of scepticism.” [Critchley, 158] Heidegger argues for a profound linkage 
of existence with truth, in that Dasein is the disclosure of Being as care. If one accepts this, 
then being is in itself an unfalsifiable truth. In any case, skepticism is not a particularly 
fruitful position to hold: if one refuses to accept any grounds for knowledge whatsoever, then 
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there can be no exchange or discussion – it would be futile. What deconstruction is concerned 
with is the questioning of those grounds, and the problematics of establishing them; in other 
words, the problem of articulation. The basic question deconstruction asks, then, is how is a 
text grounded? Put another way, how is it possible to understand a text? 
 
A possible answer comes from the concept of clôtural reading, the very practice of 
deconstruction. Most forms of reading are concerned with ‘discovering’ the ‘message’ of the 
text. The text is seen as an open structure that must be completed by the act of reading: this 
completion is closure, and is accomplished once and for all. Clôtural reading, however, 
constantly transgresses and restores closure. The text is read conventionally, producing a 
‘commentary’ that essentially repeats the text; then (and this is the point of deconstruction) a 
moment of alterity is discovered which opens the text up to another, wholly other reading. 
This other reading is supplemental: it cannot exist without the first repetition, yet it is entailed 
by that repetition. Moreover, the relation between the readings is not totalisable. It does not 
belong in the realm of thesis-antithesis-synthesis, or even Hegelian dialectic. Clôtural reading 
generates a disrupted narrative. 
 
This disrupted narrative is the goal of negative theology, as practiced by Williams in 
the mystic tradition of Christianity, which includes Julian of Norwich, Meister Eckhart and 
Pseudo-Dionysius.  For Williams, the Way of Rejection of Images is vitally important to the 
totality of Christian understanding: 
 
The one Way was to affirm all things orderly until the universe throbbed with vitality; the 
other is to reject all things until there was nothing anywhere but He. The Way of 
Affirmation was to develop great art and romantic love and marriage and philosophy and 
social justice; the Way of Rejection was to break out continually in the profound mystical 
documents of the soul, the records of the great psychological masters of Christendom. 
[DOD, 58] 
 
 There is positive theology, which has come under the eyes of critics such as Nietzsche 
as being onto-theology, the metaphysics of presence, and negative theology, which arises as a 
corrective against the problematics of presence. However, negative theology must not be 
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understood simply as irrationalism, or, qua Derrida, “a phase of positive ontotheology” 
[Derrida: 1978, 337].  
 
 The first objection is dealt with summarily by Williams: 
  
 The apophatic design is anxious to render itself independent of revelation, of all the 
 literal language of New Testament eventness… of the coming of Christ, of the 
 Passion… An immediate but intuitionless mysticism, a sort of abstract kenosis, frees 
 this language from all authority, all narrative, all dogma, all belief – and at the limit 
 from all faith. [DNT, 312] 
  
 Williams is not interested in such a mysticism. His theology is one precisely of the 
concrete and the historical: 
 
It is true that all that did happen is a presentation of what is happening; all the historical 
events… are a pageant of the events of the human soul… Christendom has always held 
that the two are indissolubly connected; that events in the human soul could not exist 
unless the historical events had existed. If, per impossible, it could be divinely certain that 
the historical events upon which Christendom reposes had not happened, all that could be 
said would be that they had not yet happened. If time and place are wrong, they are at 
least all that can be wrong. If, by a wild fantasy, the foundations of Christendom are not 
yet dug, then we have only the architect’s plan. But those foundations can never be dug 




Messias and the New Testament know nothing about blotting out the past. Messias insists 
on making it prominent. It is natural to a doctrine which has not hesitated to make its God 
responsible for all; responsible in this sense – that knowing with a clarity inconceivable to 
man everything that would happen in his creation yet he ordained that creation... It is 
impossible for the mind of man to contemplate an infinitesimal fraction of the persistent 
cruelty of mankind, and beyond mankind of the animals, through innumerable years, and 
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yet remain sane. ‘The whole creation groaneth and travaileth together in pain.’ The 
Omnipotence contemplated that pain and created; that is, he brought its possibility – and 
its actuality – into existence. [Heaven, 98-99] 
 
But if such is the case, what then is the nature of Williams’s negative theology? A 
clue is provided by his reluctance in his novels to name God, Who is variously referred to as 
the Juggler and the Fool (The Greater Trumps) and Maker and Destroyer of Images (The 
Place of the Lion), et al. This almost medieval resort to epithets extends to his consistent 
naming of Christ as Messias; for Williams, words have power. In a sense, they are power. 
This is logocentrism in its most literal sense – the idea of the Word not merely as effective 
and sufficient representation of originary essence, but as that very essence itself. In the 
beginning was the Word – and Williams takes very much to heart the dictum that “The Word 
was made flesh” [John 1:14].  
 
The thing as it happens on the earth and in the world, the thing as it happens on the earth 
and in the soul, are two stresses on one fact; say, on one Word. [Heaven, 47] 
 
 But this Word cannot be apprehended solely on the basis of a given biblical 
revelation. The theology that allows us knowledge of God is also fraught with the difficulty 
of speaking of God, and even further, the very faith that initiates the movement towards God 
is itself flawed and mistaken. Yet this is, for Williams, the point both of theology and of faith: 
 
Unless devotion is given to a thing which must prove false in the end, the thing that is 
true in the end cannot enter. But the distinction between necessary belief and unnecessary 
credulity is as necessary as belief; it is the heightening and purifying of belief…Usually 
the way must be made ready for heaven, and then it will come by some other; the 
sacrifice must be made ready, and the fire will strike on another altar. So much Cain saw, 
and could not guess that the very purpose of his offering was to make his brother’s 
acceptable. [Heaven, 25] 
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 Here we may have a description, even predating Derrida, of clôtural reading. The 
primary narrative, the ‘first meaning’ of the text, is insufficient but necessary. Its repetition is 
the enabling condition of moment of alterity. It is in the crossing of the two strands of 
meaning that one discovers an ellipsis, an opening of possibility which disrupts the closure of 
the narrative. Small wonder Cain was jealous: his murder of Abel, the first murder in history, 
is the result of his frustration at the disruption of his own totalising narrative, which would 
close with the mythic pattern of sacrifice accepted. Instead, the sacrifice is spurned, the 
imagined compact is broken, and the jealous soul demands blood. Similarly the turning away 
of Abraham’s knife from Isaac; similarly the story of Messias himself. The Christian 
historical narrative is replete with instances of promises fulfilled otherwise than expected. 
The emblematic crossing of the strands may well reflect another, historical, cross. 
 
 The negativity of Williams’s theology, therefore, is not only in content and even 
method; it is the mode of its operation. Yet it is a negativity which though other than is not 
independent of positive theology. It is a parergon, a frame that not only delineates but 
constitutes the border of its field; more, it comes to supplement the original field, 
demonstrating in its very difference from positive theology the inadequacy of its originating 
concept. It does not exist separately from positive theology; neither is it sufficient as a path to 
the truth; but it is a necessary corrective: 
  
The answer is an example of this quality of disbelief. It is entirely accurate; it comes 
straight from the Creed. It covers all the doctrines. It is entirely consistent with sanctity. 
Yet undoubtedly it also involves as much disbelief as possible; it allows for it, it 
encourages the sense of agnosticism and the possibility of error. It hints ambiguity – 
nicely balancing belief and disbelief, qualifying each by the other, and allowing belief 
only its necessary right proportion of decisiveness. [DOD, 190] 
 
 Williams’s note on “the possibility of error” is instructive. Following a deconstructive 
argument, it is clear that all signification of God is predicated on God’s absence; else there 
would be no need for representation at all. Positive theology speaks of a God whose presence 
is assumed, and applies predicates to that God. Negative theology questions that speaking, 
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and that predication. Hence it functions as a supplement to positive theology. Pseudo-
Dionysius suggests that: 
 
 Theological tradition has a dual aspect, the ineffable and mysterious on the one hand, 
 the open and more evident on the other. The one resorts to symbolism and involves 
 initiation. The other is philosophic and employs the method of demonstration. 
 (Further, the inexpressible is bound up with what can be articulated.) [Luibheid, 283; 
 my emphasis] 
 
 Negative theology, therefore, is not merely apophatic, as Williams has already pointed 
out. But neither is it merely a moment within the dialectic of onto-theology. Rather, negative 
theology, in supplementing positive theology, supplants it. Hart draws attention to the process 
by which this occurs: 
 
 Negative theology supplies positive theology with what it lacks: a guarantee that 
 improper predicates can speak of God, not solely a human image of God. As soon as 
 this occurs, though, attention is drawn to the distinction between the proper and the 
 improper. Even the proper predicates which on ascribes to God in positive theology – 
 that He is good, He is one and that He is truth, and so on – are seen to be improper 
 and so require negation if they are to refer to God. [Hart, 201] 
 
 Negative theology, properly understood, is the theology of radical negativity. As 
Pseudo-Dionysius puts it: 
 
 It falls neither within the predicate of nonbeing nor of being… There is no speaking 
 of it, nor name or knowledge of it. Darkness and light, error and truth – it is none of 
 these. It is beyond assertion and denial. We make assertions and denials of what is 
 next to it, but never of it, for it is beyond every assertion, being the perfect and unique 
 cause of all things, and, by virtue of its preeminently simple and absolute nature, free 




 Negative theology, then, performs the deconstruction of positive theology. 
Accordingly, just as the deconstruction of metaphysics uses the term ‘sign’ under erasure, 
negative theology uses the word ‘God’ under erasure. Williams performs the same erasure 
through the use of epithets: Messias could well be written Messiah. The death of the God of 
onto-theology is therefore nothing new to the Christian tradition; if we understand negative 
theology as the clôtural reading of the Christian narrative, that death is inscribed within 
Scripture itself.  
 
 This movement may be seen in Williams’s most overtly theological novel, The Place 
of the Lion. Its plot revolves around the angelicals, that is, the physical manifestations of 
virtue, ethical-metaphysical concepts made flesh. It is the power of the angelicals to bring 
concepts into being – say, rather, to shape matter into a being consonant with concepts. This 
is reminiscent of Heidegger’s notion of  Austrag, the difference (Differenz) between Being 
and beings (Sein and Dasein) which is the precursor of Derrida’s concept of différance. 
Power operates as a bridging of Austrag. It is what Heidegger names Anwesen, coming-into-
presence. Being, for Heidegger, is not presence – but Being may come into presence, the 
noumenal shaping the phenomenal. The operation of power, then, is “the movement of form 
into the content outside of which it is a void of potential function, of the abstract into the 
particular…. It is the translation of generic identity into the specific identities outside whose 
actualization it does not exist, of humanity into the selves comprising it. Not a form, but a 
mechanism of formation; not a being, but a coming to being; a becoming.” [Massumi, 21] 
 
 The angelicals draw those who fall under their influence into their Being; but it is the 
power of man, drawing from the balance of angelic power within himself, to resist that call 
and instead to become more fully himself – to establish his own presence as an act of will, 
and thus to gain dominion over the angelicals. This dominion finds the form of the Naming of 
the Beasts, the archetypal human act performed by Adam before the Fall:  
 
 A voice, crying out in song, went through the air of Eden, a voice that swept up as the 
 eagle, and with every call renewed its youth. All music was the scattered echo of that 
 voice; all poetry was the approach of the fallen understanding to that unfallen 
 meaning. All things were named – all but man himself, then the sleep fell upon the 
 Adam, and in that first sleep he strove to utter his name, and as he strove he was 
 divided and woke to find humanity doubled. The name of mankind was in neither 
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 voice but in both; the knowledge of the name and its utterance was in the perpetual 
 interchange of love. Whoever denied that austere godhead, wherever and however it 
 appeared – its presence, its austerity, its divinity – refused the name of man. [POL, 
 190] 
 
 This is a metaphysical passage, as metaphysics is defined by critical theory. The 
Naming is described as an originary – an aboriginal – speech that is sufficient to its object, as 
fallen speech can never be; and there is a heavy emphasis on the “presence” of the godhead. 
These are the two primary characteristics of metaphysics, logocentrism and presence. Here, 
as almost nowhere else, Williams engages explicitly with the Neo-Platonic influence in  
Christian theology. This is as close as he comes to a positive theology of presence. In the 
passage quoted above, it seems that God is the condition for naming – that is, the 
transcendent ground that allows the possibility of the name. Deconstruction, of course, 
attacks precisely this point: this system cannot account for its own ground.  
 
 This would appear a devastating critique; there is indeed an aporia within Adam’s 
naming of the beasts, a place where his language cannot reach – that is, Adam himself. At 
this point he is unnamed, and he cannot speak his name. In his attempt he finds himself 
doubled, faced with an image of himself that yet is not himself. The self, for the first time, 
becomes aware of the other. Fitting neatly into the terms of feminist critical discourse, that 
other is the female. It is in the “interchange” between self and other that identity is formed; 
that perfect interchange is unfallen speech, and that is the space within which the godhead 
resides.  
 
 Clearly this cannot be all; for the history of humanity recalls that man did indeed fall. 
The names of the beasts became insufficient to their reality; fallen language is always only 
metaphorical. There is an unbridgeable gap between intention and meaning – and Williams 
tells us that “interpretations nearly always are wrong; interpretations in the nature of things 
being peculiarly personal and limited. The act was personal but infinite, the reasoned 
meaning was personal and finite. Interpretation of infinity by the finite was pretty certain to 
be wrong.” [POL, 170] The noumenal cannot be known in the terms of the phenomenal. 
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 Yet the Powers do intrude; abstract principles walk the earth. To recall them to their 
proper space, one must name them anew. That is an operation of redeemed language; a 
follower of the Way of Affirmation of Images, the adept Anthony speaks the Names:  
 
 He called and he commanded; nature lay expectant about him…. At each word that he 
 cried, new life gathered…. By the names that were the Ideas he called them, and the 
 Ideas who are the Principles of everlasting creation heard him, the Principles of 
 everlasting creation who are the Cherubim and Seraphim of the Eternal. [POL, 202] 
 
 At this point, Williams is still developing his Romantic theology. The dual Ways – 
each insufficient in itself, each necessary to the other as simultaneous supplement and ground 
– are explicitly put in play. The synthesis which might resist both totalisation and (by 
consequence) deconstruction is immanent. Williams’s version of Anwesen is revealed as not 
so much the coming into presence of Being but rather the taking of being into Presence – that 
echo, once again, of the Athanasian Creed. The crucial difference is revealed through a 
clôtural reading that suspends decision between the Ways of Affirmation and Rejection of 
Images, making possible a third way that partakes of both and is reducible to neither. That 
third way rescues Williams’s conception of God from reduction to onto-theology. 
 
 The ethical consequences of such a move are profound. With the onto-theological 
God dead and buried, we may now turn to another ethical ground that throws much light on 
Williams’s theology – Levinas’s ethics of the Face. 
 
 Levinas is particularly interesting in this context as he began as, and substantially 
remained, a phenomenologist much influenced by the work of Husserl and Heidegger. One 
may indeed view much of his own writing as a response to the Heideggerian ethics of Dasein, 
which however he takes much further. For Levinas, Dasein serves to point to that which is 
beyond even being: 
 
 Is the adventure of being, as being-there, as Da-sein, an inalienable belonging to self, 
 a being proper – Eigentlichkeit, an authenticity altered by nothing – neither support 
 nor help nor influence – conquering, but disdaining the exchange in which a will 
 awaits the consent of the stranger – the virility of a free ability-to-be, like a will of 
 race and sword? Or, on the contrary, would not to be, that verb, signify – in being-
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 there – non-indifference, obsession by the other, a search and a vow of peace? 
 [Levinas 1998: 207] 
 
 Levinas answers that question with a penetrating analysis of the inevitable political 
content of Heideggerian Dasein, a pernicious content that wells up within the fundamental 
emptiness of self-grounded Being. For “[the] ultimate and most authentic mission of 
existence or Dasein is to recollect (wiederholen) and totalize its temporal dispersal into past, 
present and future.” [Levinas 1986: 20] That project is morally empty, and its fulfillment an 
end without a point, eschaton without telos. Authenticity demands that being be a self-
grounded presence of just the sort that is attacked by Derrida as ontotheological. On this 
account, Heidegger merely succeeds in replacing the name of God with Dasein. He could 
hardly avoid doing so, for this is the legacy of the “Greek” or rationalist strain in Western 
philosophy and theology both: 
  
 the most essential distinguishing feature of the language of Greek philosophy was its 
 equation of truth with an intelligibility of presence…. According to the Greek model, 
 intelligibility is what can be rendered present, what can be represented in some eternal 
 here and now, exposed and disclosed in pure light…. The Greek notion of being is 
 essentially this presence. [Cohen 1986: 19] 
 
 That is, our very mode of thought and argumentation presupposes and privileges a 
certain conception of being. It does not allow for the possibility of a hidden being, a being 
suggested but not named. Yet that veiled being is the very essence of God for Levinas: 
 
 The God of ethical philosophy is not God the almighty being of creation, but the 
 persecuted God of the prophets who is always in relation with man and whose 
 difference from man is never indifference…. I can never have enough in my relation 
 to God, for he always exceeds my measure, remains forever incommensurate with my 
 desire. In this sense, our desire for God is without end or term: it is interminable and 
 infinite because God reveals himself as absence rather than presence… the absence of 
 God is better than his presence, and the anguish of man’s concern and searching for 
 God is better than consummation or comfort. [Cohen 1986: 32] 
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 So, for Levinas God hides Himself so as to provide an eternal object for man’s 
questing, and thus also forever evades totalization as part of any limited, temporal conception 
of being. Fortunately or unfortunately, that also by definition places Him beyond the reach of 
any discourse informed by the “Greek” notion of truth. The Kierkegaardian characterization 
of God as the object of an irrational faith arises here, for there is just no possibility of coming 
to rational grips with a figure so transcendent as to be, as Levinas puts it, Otherwise than 
Being. Levinas’s conception of God also closes the circle opened by Nietzsche, in which “I 
fear we are not getting rid of God because we still believe in grammar.” [Nietzsche: 1968, 38] 
The God of that grammar – a Greek grammar – is dis-covered as the God of ontotheology. 
Yet in that same movement Levinas re-covers the absolutely transcendent, absolutely other 
God of radical alterity, which proves to be the God of Abraham.  
 
 This also proves to be Williams’s God, who appears in many guises but always in 
disguise, never as pure presence, but glimpsed through the dark glass of Williams’s 
promiscuous symbology. Williams makes consistent use of myth to provide masks for the 
operation of divine power: the Graal (sic) in War in Heaven, the Stone of Suleiman 
(Solomon) in Many Dimensions. However, his most potent use of myth appears in The 
Greater Trumps. 
 
 The novel is distinguished by its juxtaposition of Christian and pagan discourses, 
operating simultaneously throughout the text in a strange yet telling synthesis. The main 
theme is precisely that of synthesis – understood not as a Hegelian, dialectical “third 
movement” but as the suspension of judgement between two valid yet discrete hypotheses, 
both representative of the truth yet not sufficient to it, in the play of grounding and 
supplementation characteristic of clôtural reading.  
 
 Indeed, in The Greater Trumps Williams returns to a familiar trope – the artifact of 
power. In this case the artifact is doubled: there is a deck of Tarot cards – said to be the 
originary deck of which all others are but faint copies – and there is a set of magical 
figurines, precisely reproducing the figures on the cards, which dance endlessly (with a single 
possible exception) in a motion that is representative of the motion of the universe. The cards 
invoke natural and supernatural forces; the figures tell the state of the universe. As the cards 
are used, so the figures dance; as the figures dance, so the cards move – and the world moves 
along with them. The Greater Trumps turns on the use of these artifacts, and the perils of 
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their abuse, and the role that they play in bringing myth into reality; say, rather, in 
demonstrating the structures of myth operating in reality. 
 
 It is tempting to read the symbology of the Tarot through the lens of a specific 
tradition, and one would expect a Christian interpretation of their significance. Yet Williams 
refuses to do so. When Nancy Coningsby, daughter of the owner of the cards, asks of that 
Juggler, “Is it God then?” her paramour, the young adept Henry Lee, can only reply: 
 
“What do we know?… This isn’t a question of words. God or gods or no gods, these 
things are, and they’re meant and manifested thus. Call it God if you like, but it’s 
better to call it the Juggler and mean neither God nor no God.” [GT, 98] 
 
 The name of the figure is a culturally-conditioned, essentially arbitrary phenomenon, 
and it is “better” to use the Tarot name instead of attempting to read its structures into a pre-
existing context of understanding because the names adduced therefrom – in this case, God – 
are overdetermined, loaded with excess baggage, simultaneously meaning too much and too 
little; in short, incapable of accurate representation. This is an illustration of the slippage 
between sign and presence. The trace of the presence suggested by the existence of the sign is 
here placed under erasure: the very act of speaking the name of the sign is to deny making 
any statement on presence; hence, to “mean neither God nor no God”. Williams establishes 
the limits of natural language at the borders of the sign. The sign can mean something – it can 
mean itself. But it can never speak of presence. 
 
 The Juggler is better known as the Fool, the figure of excess, of the supplement, the 
parergon, différance – call it what we will, it is that which cannot be accounted for within the 
system of signification yet without which all signification is meaningless, for it is the very 
condition of the possibility of the sign. That is why, among the Greater Trumps, its number is 
zero, or nought – hardly a number at all, and indicative of its place outside the system yet 
vital to it. Sybil Coningsby, Nancy’s aunt, and a sibyl in deed, defines it thus: “Nought isn’t a 
number at all. It’s the opposite of number” and goes on – “if you say  that any mathematical 
arrangement of one and nought really makes ten – Can it possibly be more than a way of 
representing ten?” [GT, 17] In other words, to represent the supplement in the terms of the 
system is merely to place an empty, null marker but not to encapsulate its being, for that must 
remain forever outside the framework of the system. The one requires a nought to represent 
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ten – yet the notion of ten tells us nothing of the nature of nought. This is the very definition 
of différance. 
 
 For that reason, too, the figure of the Fool is immobile within the circle of dancing 
figurines – or, at least, it is immobile for all but Sybil. The immobility of the Fool is seen by 
adepts such as Henry and his uncle Aaron as “a kind of counterpoise” [GT, 73] for the motion 
of the rest – but that is merely renaming the phenomenon without explaining it. For them 
“there’s only a tale to tell us that it does move.” Yet Sybil sees the movement clearly, for all 
that she is, to Aaron, but “a fool, and the sister of a fool”. [GT, 85] It is just because she is, by 
his lights, a fool, that she is able to see it “completing the measures, fulfilling the dance.” 
[GT, 86] She is so because, instead of seeking self-possession, she is herself possessed by 
goodness, that is, the natural order of the universe, and the will of what is elsewhere in 
Williams called the Omnipotence, whose movement is figured by the Fool. It is because Sybil 
is so taken up into the order, so aware and accepting of it, that she is able to see the motion of 
the Fool. 
 The others try to enforce their will upon the world through the use of the Tarot, and 
come to grief. It is Sybil, in the end, who brings peace:  
 
 The power of [the cry of anguish] was withdrawn; all power, all utterance, was 
 withdrawn. The unexpected silence was more awful than even the wailing, for it was 
 not a silence of relief but impotence. The cry of the world was choked; the ball, tossed 
 from the Juggler’s hand, revolved in unspoken anguish… Through the silence Sybil 
 called… “All’s well; the child’s found…. He’s here. Come and adore.” [GT, 226] 
 
 The child in question is the dead son of the madwoman Joanna, but also, mythically, 
Osiris the son of Isis, and Jesus the son of Mary. The mythical figures are all found collapsed 
into a single narrative of rebirth, yet that very narrative suggests that something remains 
beyond the power of myth – beyond, even, narrative itself. When Sybil is asked whether 
Nancy is Messias (that is, Messiah under erasure, or Messiah) she replies that she is “near 
enough” – not quite, then, not entirely, but sufficiently so for the purposes of her narrative. 
This elusiveness is not mere prevarication or bad faith; it is Williams’s statement on the very 
power of naming. To name someone, to give them a title, is to place them in a narrative, and 
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to inscribe them into a myth. Yet to do so is also to close off the possibilities of their human 
actions, lives and destinies.  
 
 Ultimately, all human stories correspond to an ur-story – that is the place of myth and 
narrative – but there is always something that escapes the signification, always something 
unique that can only be recognized in the light of love. Any attempt to tell the story of a 
human being without that loving knowledge must leave out the very heart of that tale. Any 
attempt to live without love must finally end in despair of meaninglessness.  
 
 But if the Tarots hold, as has been dreamed, the message which all things in all places 
 and times have also been dreamed to hold, then perhaps there was meaning in the 
 order as in the paintings; the tale of the cards being completed when the mystery of 
 the sun has opened in the place of the moon, and after that the trumpets cry in the 
 design which is called the Judgement, and the tombs are broken, and then in the last 
 mystery of all the single figure of what is called the world goes joyously dancing in a 
 state beyond moon and sun, and the number of the Trumps is done. Save only for that 
 which has no number and is called the Fool, because mankind finds it folly till it is 
 known. It is sovereign or it is nothing, and if it is nothing then man was born dead. 
 [GT, 195f] 
 
 That is why no-one except Sybil sees the Fool, for the movement of the Fool is the 
movement of love, and its movement remains outside the dance of the Trumps yet 
indispensably a part of it. So it is not God, and yet not otherwise than God. As elsewhere in 
Williams, “Neither is this Thou… Yet this also is Thou.”  [WH, 137] The Fool symbolizes 
God, but we are never allowed to forget that it is merely a symbol for His transcendent 
otherness. Our relationship with God is always mediated, for the merely human cannot 
encompass the infinite, and this mediation is always through our relationships with other 
humans. Thus Levinas: 
 
 The interhuman relationship emerges with our history, with our being-in-the-world, 
 an intelligibility and presence. The interhuman realms can thus be construed as a part 
 of the disclosure of the world as presence. But it can also be considered… as a theme 
 of justice and concern for the other as other, as a theme of love and desire which 
 carries us beyond the infinite being of the world as presence. The interhuman is thus 
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 an interface: a double axis where what is ‘of the world’ qua phenomenological 
 intelligibility is juxtaposed with what is ‘not of the world’ qua ethical responsibility. It 
 is in this ethical perspective that God must be thought, and not in the ontological 
 perspective of our being-there or of some supreme being and creator correlative to the 
 world…. God, as the God of alterity and transcendence, can only be understood in 
 terms of the interhuman dimension which… emerges in the phenomenological-
 ontological perspective of the intelligible world, but which cuts through and 
 perforates the totality of presence and points towards the absolutely other. [Cohen 
 1986: 20] 
 
 Again it is through the double-stranded clôtural reading that we approach God. God 
appears not only as being and ground but also as an ethical demand. This is the ethical 
demand with which we are presented when we view the face of the Other. In any totalizing 
narrative (that is, an unethical narrative) the Other is reduced to an aspect of the Same. It is 
taken into the self. For Levinas this is violence – “Violence is to be found in any action in 
which one acts as if one were alone to act: as if the rest of the universe were there only to 
receive the action; violence is consequently also any action which we endure without at every 
point collaborating in it.” [Levinas 1990: 6] Yet the vision of the Face is also the beginning of 
ethics: 
 
 The face, for its most part, is inviolable; those eyes, which are absolutely without 
 protection, the most naked part of the human body, none the less offer an absolute 
 resistance to possession, an absolute resistance in which the temptation to murder is 
 inscribed: the temptation of absolute negation. The Other is the only being that one 
 can be tempted to kill. This temptation to murder and this impossibility of murder 
 constitute the very vision of the face. To see a face is already to hear “You shall not 
 kill”, and to hear “You shall not kill” is to hear “Social justice”. [Levinas: 1990, 8f.] 
 
It is here that Levinas finds the beginnings of a ground for an absolute ethics; it is 
here that Williams finds the point of resistance to any ideology that would divorce belief 
from practical action: 
 
 When monotheist teaching is passed down to men by word and by scripture, it 
 captures humanity in its savagely real state. What it seems to reflect of a bygone age 
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 is what precisely constitutes its force and testifies to the way it adjusts to the human 
 condition: a world in which there are wars and slaves, sacrifices and priests, material 
 interests and crime – jealousies, hatreds and murders which fraternity itself cannot 
 resolve. The Bible does not begin the building of an ideal city in a void. It places itself 
 inside these situations which it must assume, in order to overcome them. It seems to 
 transform them by pursuing them right into their dialectical return, which is the 
 enslavement of man by man after the suppression of slavery, the survival of 
 mythologies after the crumbling of idols. To recognize the necessity of a law is to 
 recognize that humanity cannot be served by at once magically denying its condition. 
 The faith that moves mountains and conceives of a world without slaves immediately 
 transports itself to utopia, separating the reign of God from the reign of Caesar. This 
 reassures Caesar….Utopia seems not just vain in itself, it is also dangerous in its 
 consequences. The man of utopia wishes unjustly. Instead of the difficult task of 
 living an equitable life, he prefers the joy of solitary salvation. He therefore refuses 
 the very conditions in which his bad conscience had set him up as a person. He is 
 nothing but Desire: conscience by the dazzling day of his human conscience, he 
 pursues a dream as though he were still sleeping, as though another day should dawn 
 within his day, and with it another waking that would rid him of his suffocating 
 nightmares. [Levinas: 1990, 101] 
 
 That very solipsistic private utopia is the guiding vision of Williams’s villains: each 
of them, in one way or another, seeks a way towards a power that would be personal, absolute 
and perfect. The conditions of such a quest eventually destroy them. Such is the exemplary 
fate of the historian Wentworth in Descent into Hell. Thwarted personally by the failure of 
his courtship, he is presented with a professional blow in the award of a knighthood (which 
he had of course been coveting for himself) to his rival: 
 
 There was presented for him at once and clearly an opportunity for joy –  casual, 
 accidental joy, but joy. If he could not manage joy, at least he might have managed 
 the intention of joy, or (if that also were too much) an effort towards the intention of 
 joy. The infinity of grace could have been contented and invoked by a mere mental 
 refusal of anything but such an effort…. Wentworth knew he could share that 
 pleasure. He could enjoy; at least he could refuse not to enjoy. He could refuse and 
 reject damnation….With a perfectly clear, if instantaneous, knowledge of what he did, 
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 he rejected joy instead. He instantaneously preferred anger, and at once it came; he 
 invoked envy, and it obliged him. [DH, 80] 
 
 His anger is at the world which will not give him what he wants. Like a child denied a 
treat, he lashes out at the perceived injustice of the world. His reaction is violence, and it is 
Levinas who points out the absolute loneliness of the violent man: 
 
The violent man does not move out of himself. He takes, possesses. Possession denies 
independent existence. To have is to refuse to be. Violence is a sovereignty, but also a 
solitude. To endure violence in enthusiasm and ecstasy and delirium is to be 
possessed. [Levinas:1990, 9] 
 
 Self-possession ends simply as possession. As he wills, so he receives. “As he stood 
there, imagining death, close to the world of the first death, refusing all joy of facts, and 
having for long refused all unselfish agony of facts, he heard at last the footsteps for which he 
had listened.” [DH, 81] With his rejection of exchange, of community, of love, he pushes 
aside reality and embraces fantasy. The footsteps are those of an image of the woman he has 
been pursuing, a copy born out of his own frustrated desire. He sports with it, is drawn into a 
Paradisiacal realm of which he is sole lord and master, and begins the process of mental 
decay: 
 
 that was the difficulty all the while, that she was truly his, and wouldn’t be, but if he 
 thought more of her truly being, and not of her being untruly away, on whatever way, 
 for the way that went away was not the way she truly went, but if they did away with 
 the way she went away, then Hugh could be untrue and she true, then he would know 
 themselves, two, true and two, on the way he was going, and the peace in himself, and 
 the scent of her in him, and the her, meant for him, in him; that was the she he knew, 
 and he must think the more for himself…. The mist made everything clear. [DH, 83f.] 
 
 If that is clarity, one ought to pray for obfuscation. It is the “delirium and ecstasy” of 
possession. And so Wentworth dies to things other than himself. He rejects anything that 
might spoil his fantasy; thus, he rejects all that is the will of another.  
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 He would not have it: no canvassers, no hawkers, no tramps. He shouted angrily, 
 making gestures; it offended him; it belonged to the City, and he would not have a 
 City – no City, no circulars, no beggars. No; no; no. No people but his, no loves but 
 his…. [still it came,] inexorably advancing as the glory of truth…. The other, the 
 thing seen, the thing known in every fibre to be not the self, woman, or beggar, the 
 thing in the streets of the City. [DH, 88] 
 
 This is, in Levinean terms, the ultimate violence, the most basic expression of the 
murderous will. As he desires, so shall he receive; but because it is not possible to destroy all 
humanity, Wentworth dies to others as they die to him. In his own world, at least, there is no 
other will; therefore he can have no will in the wider creation, nor in the City. He has taken 
up residence in Gomorrah. 
 
Stanhope’s words describe it best: 
 
 “The Lord’s glory fell on the cities of the plain, of Sodom and another. We 
 know all about Sodom nowadays, but perhaps we know the other even better. 
 Men can be in love with men, and women with women, and still be in love and 
 make sounds and speeches, but don’t you know how quiet the streets of  Gomorrah 
 are?… The lovers of Gomorrah are quite contented…. They aren’t  bothered by 
 alteration, at least till the rain of fire of the Glory at the end, for they lose the capacity 
 for change, except for the fear of hell. They’re monogamous enough! And they’ve no 
 children… there’s no birth there, and only the second death. There’s no distinction 
 between lover and beloved; they beget themselves on their adoration of themselves, 
 and by themselves too, for creation, as my predecessor said, is the mercy of God, and 
 they won’t have the facts of creation. No, we don’t talk much of Gomorrah, and  
 perhaps it’s as well and perhaps not… When all’s said and done there’s only Zion and 
 Gomorrah.” [DH, 174f.] 
 
 In other words, the choice is between social, interpersonal justice, and the hell of an 
existence in which all others are reified into mirrors of the self. In this Williams and Levinas 
clearly stand together – in their moral universe, that which is other than I demands not merely 
to be treated as an equal, another (an-other) I, but as the Face whose demands on the self are 
absolute. It is telling that Williams speaks of the City, the Republic, which Stanhope names 
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Zion. Levinas was, politically, a Zionist. Both believe that there is no such thing as an 
individual morality; rather moral behaviour is founded on justice, which is embodied in the 
relation between persons, but goes beyond that relation to include an ethical third. That third 
is the City, or Zion, itself, the entire society structured by moral law in which self and Other 
meet.  
 
 It is here that the virtue ethics of Alasdair MacIntyre enter the picture, for he gives us 
a clear picture, firstly of the development of ethical language and thought in Western 
philosophy, and subsequently of the very nature of ethical discourse. This is crucial, for it 
provides us not only with a description of Williams’s own moral grounds, but suggests the 




The new Aquinian: Williams and Aristotelian ethics 
 
Alasdair MacIntyre is one of the most significant moral philosophers of the twentieth century. 
His virtue ethics represents a fresh direction for Anglo-Saxon philosophy, particularly after 
almost a century spent on obsessing over the epistemological status of moral predicates. His 
fundamental approach, beginning with A Short History of Ethics, has been to examine the 
historical development of ethics and moral philosophy, and hence to develop a theory to 
account for the failures of previous systems of ethics. 
 
 MacIntyre’s first major work is indeed short: it disposes of more than two thousand 
years’ worth of moral argument in fewer than three hundred pages – on the whole, it has to be 
said, with an impartial and critical eye.7 Its main worth lies in its tracing of a progressive 
movement away from socially-defined ethical norms to the individualist ethos of the post-
Enlightenment era. 
 
 A Short History of Ethics begins with an analysis of prehistorical notions of “good”, 
specifically within a Homeric context. Here we have an unproblematic situation, in which to 
be good just is to fulfill a given social role in the manner prescribed by society. Hence a good 
king rules wisely and generously, a good warrior fights courageously, and so on. With 
changing political realities, however, such a simple characterization of good behaviour 
becomes problematic. MacIntyre locates the genesis of the problem in social change – the 
shift from clan and tribal loyalties to the more sophisticated relations in the Greek polis, a 
shift brought into dramatic focus in such plays as the Oresteia. The development of social 
mobility means that the individual (seen as a stable personality) becomes dislocated from his 
function in society. What it means for him to be good is no longer given by a single role but 
must apply across a number of roles that the citizen may be called to play in his lifetime – 
playwright, soldier, husband, father, leader. Indeed the qualities that fit him for one role may 
well prove catastrophically detrimental in another. Thus tragedy becomes an important genre 
for the Greek sensibility. 
 
                                                 
7 It is necessary to note here the subtlety and sensitivity of MacIntyre’s historical analysis, for he has been 
accused (most recently and viciously by Francis Wheen) of being a reactionary antiquarian. 
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 The most important attempt to deal with this new and disturbing moral universe is, in 
MacIntyre’s view, Aristotle’s. In the Nicomachean Ethics and elsewhere, Aristotle attempts 
to characterize the good man in terms of certain virtues, such as justice, prudence, and being 
‘great-souled’. However Aristotle treats the virtues as means to an end. What end? Pleasure, 
but not all pleasure; the highest pleasure. “If happiness consists in activity in accordance with 
virtue, it is reasonable that it should be activity in accordance with the highest virtue; and this 
will be the virtue of what is best in us.” [cited in MacIntyre 1996: 79] It turns out that this 
highest virtue is theoria, philosophical contemplation – the ‘pleasantest’ activity known to 
man, or at least a certain type of man. Moreover, contemplation is good because it partakes of 
what is unchanging – and on the Greek view, that which is unchanging is divine. This 
conclusion is strikingly reminiscent of Levinas’s observation on the intelligibility of 
presence. It also entails that the virtuous man must have a lot of leisure time to indulge in 
theoria – must, indeed, be a Greek citizen and gentleman. It turns out that Aristotle’s 
conception of the good holds true only for a very narrow group, located within a specific 
historical and geopolitical milieu: one, moreover, that was already under threat at the time 
that Aristotle wrote, from his most famous pupil Alexander. 
 
 The Aristotelian legacy is inherited by Aquinas, who assimilates the notion of desire 
to God. The natural instinct of man for self-preservation is retained, but the self is extended to 
the immortal soul as opposed to bodily existence (a maneuver on which Nietzsche would 
have much to comment). The soul’s relationship with God is expressed in feudal terms, since 
Aquinas accepts that observed human nature is a fair enough guide to human nature as it 
ought to be – in other words, that the contemporary society does not distort the human 
sufficiently to warrant investigation. The table of virtues for Aquinas, therefore, is extended 
and amended, but it suffices since his moral agents still exist in a world in which social roles 
are clearly delineated and, by and large, fixed. 
 
 The great moral crisis of the Western world, for MacIntyre, occurs with the 
Enlightenment and the development of the atomistic individual, cast loose from the strictures 
of class and caste by the confluence of political enfranchisement and economic 
independence. Here MacIntyre reveals a little of the unreconstructed Marxist, in his analysis 
of the links between economic surplus and ethical discourse: 
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 … the distinctive values of equality and of the criteria of need which Christianity in 
 large part begot could not possibly commend themselves as general values for human 
 life until it began to appear possible for the basic material inequalities of human life to 
 be abolished. So long as men produce such a small economic surplus that most men 
 have to live at or near  subsistence level and only a few can enjoy much more than 
 this, so long must the form of the consumption entrench an inequality of rights in 
 social life. Equality under such conditions has to be a vision at best, and to give that 
 vision religious sanction is the onlyway of maintaining it. It is only in small, separated 
 communities that values of fraternity and equality can be incarnated; they cannot 
 provide a program for society as a whole… The paradox of Christian ethics is 
 precisely that it has always tried to devise a code for society as a whole from 
 pronouncements which were addressed to individuals or small communities to 
 separate themselves from the rest of society. [MacIntyre 1996:111] 
 
 With the Enlightenment, the economic conditions arose which made possible “liberty, 
fraternity, equality” for the mass of humanity (at least in parts of Europe) just at the same 
time that the Christian underpinnings of social mores came under attack. Those 
underpinnings had always depended on a minority making themselves holy – that is, apart. 
Thus the importance of the monastery, the convent, the institution of priesthood.  Now, for 
the first time in recorded history, that apartness became available to a majority of men, 
without necessitating their withdrawal from economic life (which, in fact, had never truly 
occurred even in the most severe monastic orders). With the breaking of the feudal order 
came rapid social change, and this was reflected in the rise of the concept of the individual as 
a being entirely separate from his social roles. 
 
 The impact of this change was to divorce any notion of morality from social order. 
The modern era is marked, ethically speaking, by the proliferation of attempts to base moral 
behaviour on grounds other than divine revelation and social roles. MacIntyre traces the 
evolution of these attempts through thinkers as diverse as Hume, Spinoza, Rousseau, Kant, 
Hegel – right down to R. M. Hare. His greatest insight is to classify their various arguments 
into two categories. One is argument by form, in which the ethicist attempts to discover a 
universally applicable heuristic for making moral decisions. The other is argument by ends, 
in which the ethicist attempts to define universally applicable ends to which all men aspire, or 
should aspire. Kant is the great figure of the former, with his formulation of the categorical 
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imperative; the prescriptivism-emotivism debate in Anglo-Saxon philosophy features two 
poles of the latter.  
 
 What this analysis reveals is that with the collapse of a unitary social-moral order, 
moral discourse is itself drained of meaning. Increasingly the terms of the moral vocabulary 
become incommensurate, as different sectors of society appropriate the preexisting language 
for their own ends. It becomes impossible in practice, and even in theory, to articulate the 
various orders of moral speech. This is, for MacIntyre, the reason that moral debate has 
become interminable. The opposing sides are not even using the available vocabulary in ways 
that can be synthesized. They are reduced to speaking at, rather than to each other. Virtue, 
then, is entirely dependent on one’s specific and generally non-commensurable set of social 
circumstances. Even more depressingly, he argues that without the development of a new 
social order there cannot be a regeneration of moral discourse. 
 
 That is not to say that it is futile to hope for such regeneration. MacIntyre offers us a 
lifeline: 
 
 What [men and women of good will] set out to achieve… was the construction of new 
 forms of community within which the moral life could be sustained so that both 
 morality and civility might survive the coming ages of barbarism and darkness…. 
 What matters at this stage is the construction of local forms of community within 
 which civility and the  intellectual and moral life can be sustained through the new 
 dark ages which are already upon us. And if the tradition of the virtues was able to 
 survive the horrors of the last dark ages, we are not entirely without grounds for hope. 
 This time however the barbarians are not waiting beyond the frontiers; they have 
 already been governing us for quite some time. And it is our lack of consciousness of 
 this that constitutes part of our predicament. We are  waiting not for a Godot, but for 
 another – doubtless very different – St. Benedict.  [MacIntyre 1981: 245] 
 
 This is where Williams comes in, for there is a definite development within his novel 
sequence of a series of types which constitute his vision of the men and women of good will 
who will preserve the moral life. They are not monastics – they cannot be – but they are 
people of virtue, a priesthood within the mass of unregenerate humanity, sanctified by their 
virtue and benevolence.  
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 The first of these is Inkamasi, who is something of a Rousseauean noble savage. His 
virtues are of a Homeric order, displaced into the modern world. His chief attribute is that he 
is kingly, and all his virtues support a particular conception of the role of a king. His physical 
stature, grace and strength may be taken for granted; the dignity and gravitas with which he 
accepts humiliation, defeat and ultimately death are completely in keeping with tragic 
monarchs from the Iliad onwards. These virtues he bears as aspects of the authority he 
receives from God. At this point it seems as if Williams is arguing for an Enlightenment-style 
absolute monarch, a Sun King whose Richelieu is God Himself. Yet Inkamasi dies without 
issue, and the fate of Africa is to remain under Empire. The moral authority invested in him is 
without practical power, for the “beautiful” kingship exists only where both king and subject 
enter freely and lovingly into their relation. While most men remain subject to the 
blandishments of a Nigel Considine, that project cannot be realized. Williams, then, enacts 
within Shadows of Ecstasy the final collapse of the feudal social order, even in its most 
idealized form. In a world where men are not content to accept their station in life, kingship is 
impossible. 
 There is, however, another figure in the text who points the way to another possibility. 
That is the surgeon Sir Bernard, the man of science. It is knowledge, properly applied, that 
saves man from fanaticism: 
 
 He saw the intellect and logical reason of man no longer as a sedate and necessary 
 thing, but rather a narrow silver bridge passing over an immense depth, around the 
 high guarded entrance of which thronged clouds of angry and malign presences. Often 
 mistaking the causes and often misjudging the effects of all mortal sequences, this 
 capacity of knowing cause and effect presented itself nevertheless to him as the last 
 stability of man. Always approaching truth, it could never, he knew, be truth, for 
 nothing can be truth till it has become one with its object, and such union it was not 
 given to the intellect to achieve without losing its own nature. But in its divine and 
 abstract reflection of the world, its passionless mirror of the holy law that governed 
 the world, not in experiments or ecstasies or guesses, the supreme perfection of 
 mortality moved. He saluted it as its child and servant, and dedicated himself again to 
 it, for what remained to him of life, praying it to turn the light of its awful integrity 
 upon him, and to preserve him from self-deception and greediness and infidelity and 
 fear. “If A is the same as B,” he said, “and B is the same as C, then A is the same as 
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 C. Other things may be true; for all I know, they may be different at the same 
 time; but this at least is true….” [SE, 121] 
 
Sir Bernard believes in the existence of absolute truth, and its contingent representation 
within phenomena. It is telling that, as a scientific man, his first recourse is to the rules of 
logic which are indeed immutable at least as long as we wish to remain coherent and rational: 
“’If A is the same as B,’ he said, ‘and B is the same as C, then A is the same as C.’ The 
property of equivalence appears again and again in philosophy, mathematics and science – 
for example, in the zeroth law of thermodynamics – and is one of the deepest underpinnings 
of rational thought. Yet Sir Bernard is hardly a mere rationalist; so much is clear from the 
instruction he leaves his son: 
 
 …disillusion was as much an illusion as illusion itself. A thing that seemed had at 
 least the truth of its seeming. Sir Bernard’s mind refused to allow it more but it also 
 refused to allow it less. It was for each man to determine how urgent the truth of each 
 seeming was…. A thing might not be true because it appeared so to [Philip], but it 
 was no less likely to be true because everyone else denied it. The  eyes of Rosamond 
 might or might not hold the secret origin of day and night, but if they apparently did 
 then they apparently did, and it would be silly to deny it and equally silly not to relish 
 it. [SE, 36f] 
  
 In Sir Bernard we see the first hints of the adept, the person initiated into knowledge 
and committed to the upholding of truth. His successors are the Archdeacon of Fardles, in 
War in Heaven, and the Chief Justice Lord Arglay of Many Dimensions. They in turn are 
prototypes for the philosopher-princes of the later novels. The Archdeacon heads the quest to 
protect the Graal; indeed he dies for it, becoming a latter-day Fisher King, for the knowledge 
of the Graal and its powers must be kept sacrosanct. Lord Arglay survives, for the sacrifice in 
Many Dimensions is his secretary Chloe Burnett, but also because there remains work to be 
done. In this we see again a movement in Williams’s thought: Inkamasi and the Archdeacon 
die because they are bearers of a power that is not meant for the world as it is, fit only for the 
life hereafter. They leave behind a world still floundering in moral emptiness. This is kenosis, 
the withdrawal of divine power from the world, an emptying-out celebrated by Levinas as 
sharpening our desire for the absent Other. Yet that leaves us still with a project, as it does 
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Lord Arglay, who returns to the writing of his book on Organic Law. Even when the ground 
of law is absent, still the Law must hold: 
 
 “There is no case beyond law…. We may mistake in the ruling, we may be deceived 
 by outward things and cunning talk, but there is no dispute between men which 
 cannot be resolved in equity. And in its nature equity is from those between whom it 
 exists: it is passion acting in lucidity.” [MD, 156] 
 
 This is another Levinean moment, for his conception of the holy duty of the Jewish 
people is precisely to uphold the Law of Moses, and hence to bear witness to the justice of 
God. It is not a dead thing of history, but a living document: 
 
 Only a God Who maintains the principle of Law can in practice tone down its 
 severity and use oral law to go beyond the inescapable harshness of Scripture…. Oral 
 law is eternally contemporary with the written…. The one neither maintains nor 
 destroys the other, but makes it practicable and readable. [Levinas 1990: 138] 
 
 The Law is continually enacted and upheld. That is the mission of those who are holy, 
set apart precisely by their observance of the Law. It is a thankless task, without reward or 
remuneration, and more likely than not (as history bore witness during Williams’s lifetime) to 
bring catastrophe upon the chosen. Yet the call is answered, and the burden borne with 
patience and long-suffering. 
 
 A similar dynamic is enacted in The Place of the Lion, but this time Williams works 
with two young men, his philosopher-princes Richardson and Anthony. Faced with the threat 
of the angelicals – abstract virtues made manifest – they embody a dual response. Anthony is 
a follower of the Way of Affirmation of Images, and hence he tames the angelicals by 
naming them: 
 
 He called and he commanded; nature lay expectant about him…. At each word that he 
 cried, new life gathered…. By the names that were the Ideas he called them, and the 
 Ideas who are the Principles of everlasting creation heard him, the Principles of 
 everlasting creation who are the Cherubim and Seraphim of the Eternal. [POL, 202] 
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 The angelicals are recalled, but this is not all. For the adept of the Way of Rejection of 
Images can refuse the naming; can, indeed, refuse being. Richardson goes to the supernatural 
fire that is the centre of angelical activity, and consigns himself to the flames. It is as valid a 
response as Anthony’s – he is “about [his] Father’s business” – for it is not suicide but 
transcendence, not death but a higher life that he seeks.  
 
 Taken together, the two young men are types already seen in Williams’s earlier 
novels: they are philosopher-princes in the mould of the Archdeacon of Fardles and Lord 
Arglay. They, too, fulfill the functions of priest and sacrifice. Richardson, like the 
Archdeacon, officiates at his own sacrifice – but it is made more clear that he chooses his 
destiny. It is the culmination of all that he stands for, and in passing from common existence 
he leaves behind Anthony to name the beasts and re-establish the created order. Like Lord 
Arglay, Anthony has much to do after the passing of his friend – but his work is not 
peripheral to the unfolding of the narrative, it is its very climax. Tellingly, too, the young men 
do not act as functionaries of offices, as do the Archdeacon and the Chief Justice; rather they 
are private individuals, acting on the dictates of conscience. It is a definite break for Williams 
from the corporate and a cleaving to the individual. 
 
 That change of focus is reflected particularly in the character of Anthony. He is 
particularly suited to his quest, being an almost-ideal combination of the man of letters and of 
action (he is the editor of a literary and philosophical journal, and was a pilot in the Great 
War) as well as having remarkable self-possession and a wonderful capacity for love and 
forgiveness. These qualities – set alongside his love for the very trying Damaris Tighe 
(simultaneously Williams’s most human, most rounded and most annoying female character) 
– serve him well in his struggle with the angelicals. 
It is difficult; he passes through dark regions of his soul when he confronts the Eagle of 
Wisdom that is to guide him:  
He was aware… of innumerable actions, many foolish, some evil; many beautiful, some 
holy. And as if he read the history of another soul he saw running through all the 
passionate desire for intellectual and spiritual truth and honesty, saw it often blinded and 
thwarted, often denied and outraged, but always it rose again and soared in his spirit, 
itself like an eagle, and always he followed in it the way that it and he had gone together. 
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The sight of his denials burned through him: his whole being grew one fiery shame, and 
while he endured to know even this because things were so and not otherwise, because to 
refuse to know himself as he was would have been a final outrage, a last attempt at flight 
from the Power that challenged him and in consequence an entire destruction by it – 
while he endured the fire fell away from him…. he was himself offering himself to the 
state he had so long desired…. he knew, and submitted. [POL, 115f.] 
 
Because that submission is to the truth of his being – and not to an angelical –  he 
survives and is transformed – not into a caricature of himself, but made more fully himself. 
That truth includes the memory of all that was evil within him: it is not forgotten, but it is 
redeemed. Elsewhere, Williams writes that “like joy [forgiveness] does not demand 
forgetfulness but absolute knowledge.” [Image, 109] and refers us to Julian of Norwich’s 
declaration that “every sin shall have worship in heaven.” This painful experience is 
Anthony’s spiritual crisis; and if he wins through, it is still by submission to that which is 
greater than he, which has power to forgive. Precisely because he does not seek to master 
wisdom or to bend it to selfish purposes, he gains dominion over it – for wisdom lies in 
rightful submission and humility. 
 
 In Anthony we see an exemplar of classic Christian virtues – patience, love, kindness, 
courage, humility. Yet he is no otherworldly paladin; that role is Richardson’s. In the 
language of the Grail quest, Richardson is simultaneously Galahad and Percival, dying to 
become the protector of the sacred mysteries. Anthony is Bors, who returns precisely because 
he is still earthy, attached to the things of the flesh. It is no accident that Anthony is the more 
attractive figure, for despite all his qualities he is still very human, and very much a romantic 
young man. Williams places the focus on him not merely for this reason, but also, 
thematically, because such virtue is what admits to normal speech. Richardson’s courage, on 
the other hand, is inhuman, which is what enables him to pass into the flames, and what 
places him beyond the realm of profane narrative. His story ends precisely at the moment he 
is made holy. 
 
 The last of Williams’s adepts appears in Descent into Hell, in the person of the poet-
playwright Peter Stanhope. Stanhope is an adept of the Doctrine of Substituted Love. His 
poetry is “the powerful exploration of power after his own manner” [DH, 66], and is as close 
 76
as art comes to reproducing the music of the spheres. When Pauline Anstruther comes to him 
with her fears of her döppelganger, he offers to bear her fears, an offer she cannot 
understand, for it is indeed on the surface absurd for one person to feel fear in another’s 
place. Yet this is precisely the Doctrine of Substituted Love that Pauline must learn, and he 
insists: 
 
“To bear a burden is precisely to carry it instead of… if you will be part of the best of 
us, and live and laugh and be ashamed with us, then you must be content to be helped. 
You must give your burden up to someone else, and you must carry someone else’s 
burden.” [DH, 98f.] 
   
 There is no impropriety in exchange; it is to be freely offered, freely accepted, and the 
acceptance every bit as important as the offer. And when Pauline does accept his aid, she 
finds herself free for perhaps the first time in her life from fear. He takes on her fear, feels it 
for her, and sets her free. One thing only he cannot take on – “He endured her sensitiveness, 
but not her sin; the substitution there, if indeed there is a substitution, is hidden in the central 
mystery of Christendom which Christendom itself has never understood, nor can.” [DH, 101] 
Fear and love may be exchanged, may be substituted for; but the burden of sin has been borne 
once and for all by Christ on the Cross, and so there is no need for man to attempt to bear 
what he cannot. 
 
 Stanhope exhibits the same virtues as the other adepts, only he is not physically 
tested, nor is he required to make a sacrifice of himself. Williams’s mature vision makes the 
substitution the sacrifice, and the hiding of the mystery is undertaken by Christ Himself. 
Stanhope’s role is to guide Pauline as she grows in knowledge and power, not to be the agent 
of redemption himself. The place of the adept grows progressively less significant as the 
individual shows signs of differentiation and development as a person. Hence we move from 
the central role of the Archdeacon in protecting the Graal, to Anthony Durrant’s support of 
Damaris as an equal (she still must work out the process of her own salvation herself), and 
thence to Stanhope’s supporting role as mentor to Pauline. As the crux of the narrative shifts 
from the fate of an impersonal object to the spiritual growth of a person, so the morally 
prescribed virtues become less significant. 
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 The culmination of this movement appears in Williams’s last novel, All Hallow’s Eve. 
In it there is no virtuous adept; rather, there is a pseudo-adept who is entirely vicious. The 
young, recently dead woman Lester is left to her own devices, to work out her fate willy-
nilly, guided only by the impulsions of her own heart. This is a novel of salvation in a moral 
vacuum: the only supernatural intervention is wicked, for it comes from the sorcerer Simon 
the Clerk. Yet Lester is not entirely without resources, for it seems that the realm of death is 
shaped by and resonates with belief.  
 
 Lester’s fate is tied intimately to that of another girl, Betty, the daughter of one of 
Simon’s pawns. Betty comes under attack from Simon, and Lester must substitute for her, 
suffering his assault in her place. In an act of substitution more literal and profound than any 
heretofore seen in Williams’s writing, Lester takes on the threat of Betty’s death. The 
syllables of the reversed Tetragrammaton, Simon’s chant of power, invoke the death-light 
upon Lester. It is the light of the second death, dissolution absolute and entire. The light 
creeps upwards, invading her incorporeal body. Yet Lester is not alone; she has support: 
 
Of one other thing she was conscious. She had been standing and now she was no 
longer standing. She was leaning back on something, some frame which from her 
buttocks to her head supported her… her arms, flung out on each side held on to a part 
of the frame, as along a beam of wood.… She pressed herself against that sole 
support. [AHE, 159] 
 
 It is the Cross that she lies upon, and that supports her substitution for Betty. As it 
turns out, Betty in her infancy had been cared for by a nurse who had secretly baptized her, 
and the rite of baptism works its wonders for both Betty and Lester. In the security of sleep, 
Betty murmurs a name: “Lester!” and that sound is the saving of Lester: 
 
As the word left her lips, it was changed. It became – hardly the Name, but at least a 
tender mortal approximation to the Name. And when it had left her lips, it hung in the air, 
singing itself, prolonging and repeating itself. [AHE, 162] 
 
 There is no longer any need for secret knowledge, or particular characteristics, or 
virtue beyond the simple acts of love. In the redeemed world, all that matters is forgiveness, 
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and substitution: being-for-the-other, as Levinas puts it. The Cross does everything else, in 
accordance with the Law. It is the “moral mathematics of the glory” that assigns to each their 
just desert; the stern yet gracious Law both punishes and saves: 
 
 An opaque cloud gathered. It had been so when that other Jew ascended; such a cloud 
 had risen from the opening of the new dimensions into which he physically passed, 
 and the eyes of the disciples had not pierced it. But that Jew had gone up into the law 
 and according to the law. Now the law was filling the breach in the law….across the 
 floor those other Clerks came on…. The smell of blood was in his nostrils; the touch 
 of burning on his flesh; this was what the crimson must be to him. He stared, as he 
 sank and as that in which he was held moved in its own fashion, at the rain of swift-
 darting points between him and himself. The City, so, was visible to him. “If I go 
 down into hell, thou art there”; but if I go down into thee - ? If even yet he could 
 attend to those points, he would escape hell; he would never have been in hell. If he 
 could not, he had his changing and unchanging faces to study. He stared at them, 
 imbecile; imbecile, they stared back – farther and farther, deeper and deeper, through 
 the rose and the burning and the blood. [AHE, 264f.] 
 
 Simon’s damnation is chosen by himself. Lester’s and Betty’s salvation is worked out 
through their love for each other. Each could not save herself, but by their willingness to 
forgive and love they become the channels for salvation of the other. All this occurs in the 
metaphysical City that is the dwelling-place of souls. Yet Williams will not rest in an easy 
and sentimental description of eternity; he insists on the logical, if painful conclusion to the 
narrative. Lester dies, truly and completely. She relinquishes being to enter the transcendent 
absence: 
 
She stood, quiet and very real, before them; almost she shone on them; then the 
brightness quivered in the air, a gleam of brighter light than day, and in a flash 
traversed all the hall; the approach of all the hallows possessed her, and she too, into 
the separations and unions which are indeed its approach, and into the end to which it 




 The end of mortal man is death. Dying to oneself, to others, separation into absence – 
that is the fate of the just. Indeed, for Williams eternal presence is the punishment of the 
damned, as witnessed by the fate of the villains Tumulty, Wentworth and Simon. They are 
locked into a presence that is entirely self-defined, where everything there is, is themselves. It 
is the totalitarian goal, and that goal once achieved proves to be its own punishment. It is the 
fate of Übermensch, and even of Dasein conceived as a totalizing narrative that shrinks all 
existence into a single point in time.  
 
 We see, therefore, in Williams’s novels a progression that encapsulates the 
intellectual history of moral discourse as propounded by Macintyre. He begins with socially-
defined notions of the good that shift into an individualistic register in which formal 
definitions of good become increasingly incoherent. The focus of the moral vocabulary is 
placed on ends – preserving life, averting evil, the salvation of individuals. However, in the 
end Williams goes even beyond Macintyre – beyond Beyond Virtue. He describes a realm in 
which there is only one criterion of goodness, and that is love – or, as Levinas prefers, “the 
taking upon oneself of the fate of the other”. [Levinas 1998: 103] That formulation serves 




The Great Rebel: Williams’s ethics of moral resistance 
 
It is now possible to make a clear statement about the moral universe Williams described. Far 
from being a simplistic or anachronistic throwback to pre-Enlightenment Christianity, it is a 
realm in which an alternative to modernist moral atomism is realized.  
 
 The Enlightenment project was essentially a search for a totalizing narrative. There 
had existed such narratives in the past – the Roman Empire, Christendom, feudalism and so 
on – but these were inadequate in the face of the economic power and social mobility of the 
modern individual. With the shattering of the old feudal order (essentially a politico-religious 
complex), there was no longer a unitary model for moral action. This led to a series of 
ultimately flawed attempts to reestablish moral discourse on ontological or epistemological 
grounds. As Alasdair Macintyre argues, the degeneration of moral language is such that rival 
discourses are now almost entirely discommensurate with each other and no real dialogue can 
take place. The result has been the fragmentation of modern society into factions and sub-
factions (many of which claim a membership of one) in which the relations between factions 
resembles a Humean state of nature. The language of morality then serves only as a cover for 
the operation of naked power, or will. When one faction seizes the upper hand it proceeds to 
impose the terms of its discourse on all others, so as to achieve once again the desired unity.  
 
 It appears, therefore, that for modern societies there exists only a pair of unpalatable 
alternatives: either moral chaos or totalitarianism. Given that chaos is an uncomfortable state 
in which to exist, human frailty dictates that there will be occasions – indeed, many of them – 
when persons abrogate their moral judgment in favour of a stable existence. They vote, in 
other words, for the party that makes the trains run on time. This is not necessarily bad: but 
when that same party insists, as a condition of its ideology, that dissident elements of society 
be purged, we are faced with the prospect of Holocaust.  
 
 Williams saw clearly the choices before the world. Indeed he stated, in the most 




 There is certainly a sense in which execution might be done; we might turn vengeance 
 into sacrifice. It is dangerous, but it could be done. It puts almost too high – perhaps 
 entirely too high – a responsibility on mortal men, but it is a responsibility we could 
 accept if we chose. It might be declared that, though we had no precedent, we 
 intended to establish a precedent. The new League of Nations (whatever form it may 
 take) should not only rise out of the  blood that has been shed in the war; it should be 
 definitely dedicated to the future with blood formally shed. If we are indeed 
 victorious, and if our chief enemies fell into our hands, we might begin a new habit 
 among the nations. We could not pretend we had any justification for it; it would be a 
 new thing. We should say, in effect: ‘We have no right to punish you for what you 
 have done in the past. We admit it entirely. But we are determined that we will make 
 it dangerous for men to do as you have done; we will make it a matter of death. We 
 shall sacrifice you to that new thing, though because it has not yet existed you cannot 
 be guilty under it and must therefore be innocent of it. We shall therefore sacrifice 
 you to our intentions; and so awful a thing is this that it is an example, and the only 
 worthy example, of how mighty a thing we are trying to do. 
  This shall make 
 Our purpose necessary and not envious, 
 Which so appearing to the common eyes 
 We shall be called purgers, not murderers.’ 
 But the purgation would be of our own hearts. [Heaven, 194] 
 
 He adds that this would be blood sacrifice, hence un-Christian; yet it is to his credit 
that he anticipated the doctrine of deterrence before the first Bomb was ever dropped. He was 
clearly no political naïf. Yet he resisted the dilemma set before him, just as he refused to 
approve of the sacrifice he so cogently foresaw. 
 
 In his novels Williams developed a third way, a path to the regeneration of moral 
discourse. Ideology might fail; the tropes of myth might prove insufficient; even quietism, the 
withdrawal of the self to focus on personal salvation, would be, in the circumstances, a selfish 
and wicked response. He therefore focused on the primal ethical demand, one that Levinas 
would articulate in the aftermath of the war that so marked the writings of both men. The 
demand of the Face, of the Other:  
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 The face, for its most part, is inviolable; those eyes, which are absolutely without 
 protection, the most naked part of the human body, none the less offer an absolute 
 resistance to possession, an absolute resistance in which the temptation to murder is 
 inscribed: the temptation of absolute negation. The Other is the only being that one 
 can be tempted to kill. This temptation to murder and this impossibility of murder 
 constitute the very vision of the face. To see a face is already to hear “You shall not 
 kill”, and to hear “You shall not kill” is to hear “Social justice”. [Levinas 1990: 9] 
 
 That is to say, the very moment one recognizes that there is an Other apart from the 
self, one is obligated absolutely to preserve that Other. The attempt to totalize it within the 
narrative of the self, to reify its existence as an aspect of the same, is violence, not to say 
murder. For Williams, this is the fundamental basis of morality, and it is a moral standard that 
extends to action and to thought. Even to desire the Other in such a way as to reduce it to a 
mirror of the self, is to commit the sin of Gomorrah. And the ultimate wages of such sin is 
death; not the passage into alterity that awaits the just, but dying into the self, as the inward-
looking, all-consuming self finds nothing but itself to view and to consume.  
 
 The modern self, then, is condemned to such a fate, but it may still be redeemed. The 
manner of its redemption is substitution. It must die to itself – that is, it must allow itself to 
become other-than its own being, being-for-the-other. It recognizes the absolute and infinite 
ethical demand of the Other, and places its own existence before that demand as sacrifice, 
utter and complete. In its willingness to accept death on behalf of the Other, it becomes 
alterity. Simultaneously the self appears as Other to another self, and must accept the 
sacrifice of that self, not as part of the narrative of its own salvation but as the Other of 
someone else’s narrative. Self-abnegation and affirmation of the Other qua Other, which 
never returns simply to the salvation of the self: simply put, the willingness to suffer eternal 
damnation for the sake of the Other, which shows no gratitude and offers no consolation, 
merely utter silence – that is the simple and terrible clause in the Paternoster, “Forgive us our 
sins as we forgive those who sin against us.” We are called to suffer as Christ did – radically 
alone, abandoned by man and God.  
 
 This is the path that Williams reveals to us, and put baldly thus it is terrifying in its 
harsh logic. Yet there is room for grace, and mercy – for the suffering of the Other is borne 
lightly, as Pauline Anstruther discovers: 
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 Perhaps, later on, she could give the Omnipotence a hand with some other’s burden; 
 everyone carrying everyone else’s, like the Scilly Islanders taking in each other’s 
 washing. Well, and at that, if it were tiresome and horrible to wash your own clothes 
 and easy and happy to wash someone else’s, the Scilly Islanders might be intelligent 
 enough. “Change here for Scilly,” she said aloud as she came to the gate. [DH, 107f.] 
 
 This is not merely a metaphysical demand, moreover. Indeed the burden of such a 
doctrine may be heavy indeed. It is, as most really profound truths are, devastatingly literal. It 
requires one to die for the Other. Yet the example before both Williams and Levinas, of the 
Allied soldiers fighting and, yes, dying, to liberate the victims of the concentration camps, did 
exist. The historical example shows that men did actually give their lives to save those they 
did not know, from whom they could never expect recompense, merely for the sake of their 
very existence. “No greater love” indeed, and it should not come as a shock that this absolute 
love should have been evoked in response to the absolute evil of Nazism.  
 
 For Williams, then, the demand of the Other was no mere metaphysical fancy. It was 
an actual call, heard and responded to. That response pointed the way to the possibility of a 
realm – the City – in which social justice might someday obtain. The vision of that City is to 
be worked for in the quotidian, not hoped for in some transcendent elsewhere or –when, for 
to place one’s hope in the life to come is to ignore the pleas of the Other in this.  
 
 In closing, then, we may remark on the achievement of a writer unjustly obscure, 
whose response to the problems of moral disintegration in the twentieth century anticipated 
and even to some degree surpassed the efforts of significant contemporary moral 
philosophers. Williams uttered a call, contrary on first appearance to the spirit of his age, 
which still was taken up and acted upon by ordinary persons – the “men and women of good 
will” – who represent the hope for justice in the dark times that have befallen mankind, and 









Primary Texts:  
 
Williams, Charles, Shadows of Ecstasy; Many Dimensions; War in Heaven; The Place of the 
Lion; The Greater Trumps; Descent into Hell; All Hallow’s Eve. Grand Rapids: William B. 
Eerdmans, 1949. 
 
Williams, Charles, The Descent of the Dove: A Short History of the Holy Spirit in the 
Church. London: Longmans, 1939. 
 
Williams, Charles, The Figure of Beatrice: a study in Dante. New York: D.S.Brewer, 1994. 
 
Williams, Charles. He Came Down From Heaven and The Forgiveness of Sins. London: 





Behler, Ernst, Confrontations : Derrida/Heidegger/Nietzsche trans. Steven Taubeneck.  
Stanford: Stanford UP, 1991. 
 
Catholic Encyclopedia [online]. www.newadvent.org/cathen 
 
Cohen, Richard A., ed. Face to Face with Levinas. New York: SUNY Press, 1986. 
 
Critchley, Simon, The ethics of deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas. Oxford: Blackwell, 
1992. 
 
Derrida, Jacques, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins UP, 1997. 
 
Derrida, Jacques, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass. London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1978. 
 
Hart, Kevin, The Trespass of the Sign. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989. 
 
Hatab, Lawrence J., Ethics and Finitude: Heideggerian Contributions to Moral Philosophy. 
Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000. 
 
Heidegger, Martin, Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell. San Francisco: 
HarperSanFrancisco, 1993. 
 
Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New 
York: Harper and Row, 1962. 
 




Jönsson, Bodil, Ten Thoughts about Time: A Philosophical Enquiry, trans. Anna Paterson. 
London: Constable, 2003. 
 
Levinas, Emmanuel, Alterity and Transcendence. London: Athlon Press, 1999. 
 
Levinas, Emmanuel, Difficult Freedom. London: Athlon Press, 1990. 
 
Levinas, Emmanuel, Entre Nous: On Thinking-Of-The-Other. New York: Columbia UP, 
1998. 
 
Levinas, Emmanuel, trans. Annette Aronowicz. Nine Talmudic Readings. Indiana: Indiana 
UP, 1990. 
 
Luibheid, Colm, ed. Pseudo-Dionysius: the complete works. Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1988. 
 
Macintyre, Alasdair, After Virtue. London: Duckworth, 1981. 
 
Macintyre, Alasdair, A Short History of Ethics, 2nd ed. Notre Dame: UND Press, 1996. 
 
Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, 
1974. 
 
Nietzsche, Friedrich, On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, trans. Walter Kaufmann 






Adorno, Theodor. Trans. Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will. The Jargon of Authenticity. 
London: Routledge, 1973. 
 
Anderson, Susan Leigh, On Kierkegaard. Belmont: Wadsworth, 2000. 
 
Armstrong, Karen, Visions of God: four medieval mystics and their writings. New York: 
Bantam, 1994. 
 
Barth, Karl, God Here and Now. London: Routledge, 2003. 
 
Beaty,  Michael D., ed. Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy. Notre Dame: UND 
Press, 1996. 
 
Best, Steven and Douglas Kellner, The postmodern turn. New York: Guilford Press, 1997. 
 
Byron, Glennis and David Punter, ed., Spectral Readings: Towards a Gothic Geography. 
London: Macmillan, 1999. 
 
Carpenter, Humphrey, The Inklings: C.S. Lewis, J.R.R. Tolkien, Charles Williams and their 
friends. London: Unwin, 1981. 
 
 86
Cavaliero, Glen, Charles Williams: Poet of Theology. London: Macmillan, 1983. 
 
Caygill, Howard, Levinas and the political. New York: Routledge, 2002. 
 
Chanter, Tina, Time, death, and the feminine: Levinas with Heidegger. Stanford: Stanford 
UP, 2001. 
 
Colledge, Edmund, O.S.A. and Bernard McGinn, trans. Meister Eckhart. Mahwah: Paulist 
Press, 1981. 
 
Coward, Harold and Toby Coshay, ed., Derrida and Negative Theology. New York: SUNY 
Press, 1992. 
 
Darwall, Stephen, ed. Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003. 
 
Evans, C Stephen, Faith beyond reason. Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans, 1998. 
 
Filmer, Kath, ed. Twentieth-century fantasists : essays on culture, society, and belief in 
twentieth-century mythopoeic literature. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992. 
 
Hadfield, A.M., An Introduction to Charles Williams. London: Robert Hale, 1959. 
 
Heidegger, Martin, Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter. New York: Harper 
and Row, 1971. 
 
Hillegas, Mark R., ed., Shadows of Imagination: The Fantasies of C.S. Lewis, J.R.R. Tolkien, 
and Charles Williams. New Edition. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1979. 
 
Houlgate, Stephen, Hegel, Nietzsche, and the criticism of metaphysics. New York : 
Cambridge UP , 1986. 
 
Howard, Thomas, The Novels of Charles Williams. New York: Oxford UP, 1983. 
 
Huttar, Charles A. and Peter J. Schakel, ed., The Rhetoric of Vision: Essays on Charles 
Williams. London: Associated Ups, 1996. 
 
Julian of Norwich, Revelations of divine love, trans. Elizabeth Spearing. New York: Penguin, 
1998. 
 
Kellenberger, J., Kierkegaard and Nietzsche : faith and eternal acceptance. New York : St. 
Martin's Press, 1997. 
 
Kierkegaard, Soren, The sickness unto death, trans. Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton UP , 
1941. 
 
Kierkegaard, Soren, Fear and trembling, trans. Alastair Hannay. New York: Viking Penguin, 
1985. 
 
Kierkegaard, Søren, The Present Age and Two Minor Ethico-Religious Treatises. London: 
 87
 
Lewis, C.S., Arthurian Torso. London: Oxford UP, 1948.  
 
Lewis, C.S., Mere Christianity. New York: Touchstone, 1996. 
 
Macintyre, Alasdair, Difficulties in Christian Belief. London: SCM Press, 1959. 
 
Mahoney, Dhira B., ed. The Grail: a casebook. New York: Garland, 2000 
 
Manlove, Colin, Christian Fantasy: From 1200 to the Present. London: Macmillan 1992. 
 
Massumi, Brian, ed. The Politics of everyday fear. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1993.  
 
Matuštík, Martin J. and Merold Westphal, ed., Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity. Bloomington: 
Indiana UP, 1995. 
 
McGrath, Alister E., Christian Theology: An Introduction, 2nd Edition. Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1997. 
 
Michelfelder, Diane P. & Richard E. Palmer, ed. Dialogue and deconstruction : the Gadamer-
Derrida encounter. Albany : State University of New York Press , 1989. 
 
Moorman, Charles, Arthurian Triptych: Mythic Materials in Charles Williams, C.S. Lewis 
and T.S. Eliot. New York: Russell & Russell, 1973. 
 
Mulhall, Stephen, Inheritance and originality : Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Kierkegaard. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001. 
 
Nietzsche, Friedrich, Beyond good and evil : prelude to a philosophy of the future, trans. R. J. 
Hollingdale. Harmondsworth : Penguin , 1990 
 
Nietzsche, Friedrich, Thus spoke Zarathustra : a book for everyone and no one, trans. R. J. 
Hollingdale. Baltimore, MD : Penguin Books , 1969. 
 
Nietzsche, Friedrich, Twilight of the Idols, trans. R. J. Hollingdale. Baltimore: Penguin, 
1968. 
 
Norris, Christopher, Deconstruction: theory and practice. London: Routledge, 2002. 
 
Peterson, Michael, et al. ed. Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, 2nd Ed. Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 2001. 
 
Phillips, D.Z. and Timothy Tessin, ed. Kant and Kierkegaard on religion. New York : St. 
Martin's Press, 2000. 
 




Plotnitsky, Arkady, Reconfigurations : critical theory and general economy. Gainesville : 
University Press of Florida , 1993. 
 
Prickett, Stephen, ed. Reading the text : Biblical criticism and literary theory Cambridge, 
MA: Blackwell , 1991. 
 
Prickett, Stephen, Words and the Word : language, poetics, and biblical interpretation. 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986. 
 
Rapaport, Herman, Heidegger & Derrida : reflections on time and language. Lincoln : 
University of Nebraska Press , 1989. 
 
Rapaport, Herman, The theory mess: deconstruction in eclipse. New York: Columbia UP, 
2001. 
 
Rée, Jonathan and Jane Chamberlain, ed., Kierkegaard: A Critical Reader. Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1998. 
 
Sayers, Dorothy et al., cont., Essays Presented to Charles Williams. London: Oxford UP, 
1947. 
 
Shideler,Mary McDermott, The Theology of Romantic Love: A Study in the Writings of 
Charles Williams. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962. 
 
Sibley, Agnes, Charles Williams. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1982. 
 
St. Pachomius Library [online]. www.ocf.org/OrthodoxPage/reading/StPachomius/st-
pachomius.html 
 
Sussman, Henry, The Hegelian aftermath : readings in Hegel,Kierkegaard, Freud, Proust, and 
James. Baltimore : Johns Hopkins UP , 1982. 
 
Underhill, Evelyn, Mysticism: the nature and development of spiritual consciousness. 
Oxford: Oneworld, 1993. 
 
Weston, Michael, Kierkegaard and Modern Continental Philosophy. New York: Routledge, 
1994. 
 
Willis, Wendell, ed., The Kingdom of God in Twentieth-Century Interpretation. Peabody: 
Hendrickson Publishers, 1987. 
 
Wolfreys, Julian, Deconstruction· Derrida. London: Macmillan, 1998. 
 
Williams, Charles, The Image of the City and Other Essays. London: Oxford UP, 1958. 
 
Williams, Charles, Witchcraft. London: Faber and Faber, 1946. 
 
 
 
